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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

PARS II.
De aequalitate probata per exclusionem inaequalitatis.
ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 354-357.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Sed nunc iam ad propositum redeamus.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, divinas personas aequari quantum ad magnitudinem positive[1] per hoc, quod una essentia est in singulis tota. Hic ostendit, quod est summa in eis aequalitas, et hoc facit excludendo ab eis omnem[2] rationem inaequalitatis. Et dividitur haec pars in tres partes. In *prima* ostendit, quod non cadit ibi ratio totius[3] integri. In *secunda* ostendit, quod non cadit ibi ratio generis et speciei,[4] ibi: *Hic adiiciendum est, quod tanta est aequalitas* etc. In *tertia* ostendit, quod non cadit ibi ratio numeri, ibi: *Quod autem Ioannes dicit* etc.[5]

Prima iterum pars habet[6] duas. In prima, quia fecerat digressionem, continuat dicta dicendis. In secunda vero ostendit, quod ibi non cadit ratio totius et partis, ibi: *Nec est*

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
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Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX

PART II
On the equality proven through the exclusion of inequality.
ARTICLE SOLE

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 354-357.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

But now presently let us return to the proposed etc.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Above Master (Peter) shows, that the Divine Persons are equal as much as regards magnitude in a positive manner[1] through this, that the one Essence is Whole in Each. Here he shows, that there is in Them a most high equality, and this he does by excluding from Them every[2] reckoning of inequality. And this part is divided into three parts. In the *first* he shows, that there does occur There a reckoning of an integral[3] whole. In the *second* he shows, that there does not occur There a reckoning of genus and species,[4] there (where he says): *Here there must be inserted, that so great is the equality* etc. In the *third* he shows, that there does not fall There a reckoning of number, there (where he says): *On the one hand, what (St.) John says* etc..[5]

Again the *first* part has[6] two (parts). In the first, because he had made a digression, he continues by saying what he has said [dicta dicendis]. But in the second he shows, that

aliqua trium personarum.

there does not occur There a reckoning of whole and part, there (where he says): *Nor is Any of the Three Persons* etc..

Item *secunda* pars, in qua ostendit, quod in divinis non cadit ratio universalis sive generis et speciei, habet duas partes. In prima ostendit, quod non est in divinis accipere genus nec speciem nec individuum. In secunda vero contra hoc opponit auctoritate Damasceni, ibi: *His autem videntur adversari quaedam*. Prima habet duas: primo ostendit, quod non est ibi ratio[7] generis vel speciei vel individui; secundo, quod non est ibi ratio materialis principii, ibi: *Notandum etiam, quod essentia divina non est materia*. Similiter pars, in qua obiicit contra hoc, habet duas: in prima ostendit, quod cadit ibi ratio universalis et individui, ratione[8] Damasceni; in secunda solvit. Primum facit ibi: *His autem videntur adversari* etc.; secundum, ibi: *Haec autem quae hic dicuntur, licet in singulis sermonibus*.

Likewise, the *second* part, in which he shows, that among the divine there does not occur a reckoning of a universal, or of genus and species, has two parts. In the first he shows, that among the divine there is not accepting of genus nor of species nor of an individual. But in the second he opposes against this, the authority of (St. John) Damascene, there (where he says): *But to these seem opposed certain thing*s. The first has two (parts): first he shows, that there is no reckoning[7] There of genus and/or species and/or of an individual; second, that there is no reckoning There of a material principle, there (where he says): *It also must be noted, that the Divine Essence is not the matter*. Similarly the part, in which he objects against this, has two (parts): in the first he shows, that there does occur There a reckoning of universal and individual, according to the reasoning[8] of (St. John) Damascene; in the second he solves it. The first he makes, there (where he says): *But to these seem opposed* etc.; the second, there (where he says): *But, these (words), which are here said, though in each discourse*.

Quod autem Ioannes dicit etc. Haec est *tertia* particula in qua ostendit, quod in divinis non cadit ratio numeri, et haec pars habet quatuor partes. In prima, praemisso quod in aequalitate personarum non cadit ratio numeri, ostendit, quibus modis differre numero non conveniat personis, et quibus modis conveniat. In secunda ostendit, quod in divinis personis tanta est magnitudo in una persona, quanta in tribus, ibi: *Sciendum est ergo*. In tertia ostendit, quod Deus non potest dici triplex sive multiplex, ibi: *Praeterea, cum Deus dicatur trinus*. In quarta ostendit differentiam inter pluralitatem, quae est in Trinitate, et pluralitatem,[9] quae est in creaturis corporalibus, ultimo capitulo: *In rebus corporeis non tantum* etc.

On the one hand, what (St.) John (Damascene) says etc.. This is the *third* subpart [particula] in which (Master Peter) shows, that among the divine there does not occur the reckoning of number, and this part has four pats. In the first, having aforementioned that in the equality of the Persons there occurs no reckoning of number, he shows, in what manners it does not befit the Persons to differ in number, and in what manner it does befit (Them). In the second he shows, that among the Divine Persons there is as great a magnitude in one Person, as (there is) in the Three, there (where he says): *It must be known, therefore* etc.. In the third he shows, that God cannot be said (to be) threefold or manifold, there (where he says): *Besides, since God is said (to be) Triune*. In the fourth he shows the difference between the plurality, which is in the Trinity, and the plurality,[9] which is in corporal creatures, in the last chapter: *In corporeal things one is not as much* etc..

Et notandum, quod tota summa et fundamentum totius distinctionis in hoc vero consistit, quod divina essentia est magnitudo una non multiplicata, et tota non divisa est in qualibet personarum; ideo necesse est, quod personae sint omnino aequales in[10] magnitudine. Nec potest ibi cadere ratio totius *universalis*, quia illud multiplicatur in partibus; nec totius *integri*, quia illud dividitur in partes nec est totum in qualibet parte; et ita nec ratio *materialis principii*, nec ratio *numeri*.

And it must be noted, that the whole (distinction) and the fundament of the whole distinction consists, however, in this, that the Divine Essence is one magnitude, not multiplied, and the Whole has not been divided in Any of the Persons; for that reason it is necessary, that the Persons be entirely equal in[10] magnitude. Nor can there occur There a reckoning of a *universal* whole, because that is multiplied in parts, nor of an *integral* whole, because that is divided into parts and is not whole in each part; and thus neither the reckoning of a *material principle*, nor the reckoning of *number*.

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[1] Sequimur maiorem partem codicum addendo *positive*, pro quo aliqui ut B U aa cc cum ed. 1 *potentiae*, cod. D *et potentiam* ponunt. In Vat., fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, post *ad* addiicitur *aeternitatem et*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A F G H T Z cum ed. 1 *aequales* loco *aequari*.
[2] Vat. cum aliquibus tantum codicibus minus apte *communem* pro *omnem*.
[3] Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus additum *et*.
[4] Vat. adiungit *vel individui*, quod deest in mss.
[5] Mss. *Sciendum igitur est tantam aequalitatem* loco *Quod autem Ioannes dicit* etc.; sed lectio mss. est falsa, quia omittiur capitulum illud, in quo Magister ostendit in divinis non cadere rationem numeri. Idem mendum mss. recurrit paulo infra, ubi huius partis subdivisio datur, et in qua consequenter mss. exhibent tantum tres partes, omissa prima parte, quae est in Vat.
[6] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *habet* loco *in*.
[7] Aliqui tantum mss. cum Vat. *natura*.
[8] Plures codd. ut H P Q Z ee et ed. 1 *auctoritate*.
[9] Multila lectio Vat., in qua omittuntur verba *quae est in Trinitate et pluralitatem*, rearcitur ex mss. et ed. 1, sicuti et paulo post substituimus *ultimo capitulo* loco *ibi*.
[10] In Vat. et cod. cc deest *in*. Paulo ante pauci mss. ut V X *indivisa* pro *non divisa*.

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[1] We follow the greater part of the codices by adding *in a positive manner* [positive], but some, such as B U aa and cc, together with edition 1, read *the magnitude of power* [magnitudinem potentiae], codex D *magnitude and power* [magnitudinem et potentiam]. In the Vatican edition, breaking with nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, after *regards* [ad] there is inserted *eterntity and* [aeternitatem et]. A little before this very many codices, such as A F G H T and Z, together with edition 1, read *(are) equal* [aequales] for *are equal* [aequari].
[2] The Vatican edition, together with only some codices, has less aptly *the common* [communem] for *every* [omnem].
[3] Trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged the added *and* [et].
[4] The Vatican edition adds *and/or of individual* [vel individui], which is lacking in the manuscripts.
[5] The manuscripts have *It must be known, therefore, « that there is so great an equality* [Sciendum igitur est tantam aequalitatem] in place of *On the one hand, what (St.) John says* etc. [Quod autem Ioannes dicit etc.]; but the reading of the manuscripts is false, because it omits that chapter, in which Master (Peter) shows that among the divine there does not fall a reckoning of number. The same error of the manuscripts recurs a little below, where the subdivision of this part is given, and in which, consequently, the manuscripts exhibit only three parts, having omitted the first part, which is in the Vatican edition.
[6] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *has* [habet] for *(is) in* [in].
[7] Only some manuscripts together with the Vatican read *nature* [natura].
[8] Very many codices, such as H P Q Z and ee, and edition 1, have *authority* [auctoritate].
[9] The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition, in which there is omitted the words *which is in the Trinity, and the plurality* [quae est in Trinitate et pluralitatem], are repaired form the manuscripts and edition 1, just as also a little after this we have substituted *in the last chapter* [ultimo capitulo] in place of *there (where he says)* [ibi].

[10] In the Vatican edition and codex cc there is lacking *in* [in, which however would be required in English if it were not in the text].

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo,[1] utrum in divinis sit ponere totum integrale.

Secundo, utrum sit ponere totum universale.

Tertio, utrum in divinis personis sit principium materiale.

Quarto, utrum in divinis sit differentia secundum numerum.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For an understanding of this part four (things) are asked.

First,[1] whether among the divine there is a positing of an integral whole.

Second, whether there is a positing of a universal whole.

Third, whether among the Divine Persons there is a material principle.

Fourth, whether among the divine there is difference according to number.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quod a Deo excludi debeant omnes rationes inaequalitatis.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum in divinis ponendum sit totum integrale.

CIRCA PRIMUM, quod sit[2] ponere totalitatem integritatis, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum primo, et habetur in littera:[3] Tota Trinitas est in singulis personis: ergo aut est ibi implicatio falsi, aut est ibi totalitas; sed non est ibi implicatio falsi: ergo est ibi totalitas.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *ratione*, quia ubi quantitas, ibi totalitas et integritas. Sed in divinis est quantitas virtutis: ergo saltem secunum illam et integritas.

3. Item, ubi pluralitas, ibi integritas, quia omnis pluralitas constat ex unitatibus; sed in Deo est pluralitas, quia trinitas: ergo in Deo est integritas. *Si dicas*, quod illa pluralitas non integratur, quia nihil plus est in tribus quam in uno — ergo[4] si tantum est in tribus, quantum est in uno, ergo tantum credit et aeque plene credit qui credit, unum solum esse suppositum, sicut qui credit, tres esse personas; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

ARTICLE SOLE

That from God ought to be excluded all reckonings of inequality.

QUESTION 1

Whether among the divine there must be posited an integral whole.

ABOUT THE FIRST, that there is[2] a positing of a wholeness [totalitatem] of integrity [totatlitatem integritatis], seems:

1. First, through (St.) Augustine, and (through what) is had in the text:[3] 'The whole Trinity is in Each Person': therefore either there is an implication of falsehood there, or there is a wholeness there; but there is not an implication of falsehood there; therefore there is a wholeness there.

2. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown *by reason*, because where (there is) a quantity, there (is) a totality and an integrity. But among the divine there is a quantity of virtue: therefore, at least according to that, also an integrity.

3. Likewise, where (there is) plurality, there (is) integrity, because every plurality is established out of unities; but in God there is a plurality, because (there is) a trinity: therefore in God there is an integrity. *If you say*, that that plurality is not integrated, because there is nothing more in Three than in One — therefore[4] if there is as much in Three, as there is in One, therefore he believes as much and believes equally fully, that there is one Supposit alone, as he who

believes that there are Three Persons; but this is false: ergo etc..

4. Item, si aliquid est aequale alicui, eodem addito, adhuc erit aequale; ergo si aliquid est totum ad aliquid, eodem addito, adhuc erit totum; sed *tres* est totum ad unum: ergo tres presonae ad unam personam.[5]

4. Likewise, if anything is equal to something, when added to the same, it shall still be equal: therefore if anything is whole to something, when added to the same, it shall still be whole; but *three* is whole to one: therefore three persons to one person.[5]

5. Item, omne quod praedicatur de aliquibus simul et de nullo per se, est totum integrum ad illa;[6] istud constat et non habet instantiam; sed trinitas praedicatur de tribus personis simul et de nulla per se: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, everything which is predicated of some (things) together and of nothing by itself [per se], is an integral whole to them;[6] this is established and has no proof [non habet instantiam]; but "trinity" is predicated of the Three Persons together and of None by itself: ergo etc..

6. Item, omne quod removetur ab aliquo, differt ab illo genere, vel specie, vel numero, vel est totum ad illud; sed *trinitas* removetur a Patre, quia Pater non est trinitas, nec differt genere, vel specie, vel numero: ergo etc.

6. Likewise, everything which is removed from something, differs from it in genus, and/or species, and/or number, and/or is whole to it; but "*trinity*" is removed from the Father, because the Father is not a "trinity", nor does it differ (form Him) in genus, and/or in species, and/or in number: ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Ambrosius in libro de Trinitate:[7] « In divinis nullam ponimus totalitatem, quia non est ibi quantitas nec numerus ».
2. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia omne[8] integrum est compositum ex partibus; sed Deus est summe simplex: ergo in Deo nulla est totalitas nec integritas.

On the contrary: 1. (St.) Ambrose in (his) book on the Trinity (says):[7] « Among the divine we posit no wholeness, because there is There no quantity nor number ».
2. Likewise, *by reason* it seems, that everything[8] integral has been composed out of parts; but God is most highly simple: therefore in God there is no wholeness nor integrity.

3. Item, omnis pars sub ratione partis habet esse imperfectum respectu totius, quia ex aliquibus . . .

3. Likewise, every part under the reckoning of a part has to be imperfect in respect to the whole, because out of any . . .

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[1] Cod. X cum ed. 1 adiungit *quaeritur*.
[2] In ed. 1 additur *ibi*.
[3] Hic, c. 4, ubi haec verba Augustini afferuntur: « Propter unitatem naturalem totus Pater in Filio et Spiritu sancto est, totus quoque Spiritus sanctus in Patre et Filio est. Nullus horum extra quemlibet ipsorum est propter naturae divinae unitatem ». Et c. 5, ubi Augustinus inter cetera dicit: « Pars ergo Trinitatis esse non potest quicumque unus in tribus ». Ex quibus verbis proposito illa obiectionis formata esse videtur. — Vat. hic et infra in principio respons. ad hanc obiectionem praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et sex primarum edd. *essentia* loco *Trinitatis*, pro quo codd. P Q *divinitas*.
[4] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. *contra* pro *ergo*. — Cum *ergo* incipit replicatio.
[5] Sensus argumenti est: Si verum est axioma: duae res aequales remanent aequales, si utrique additur idem, etiam verum erit hoc axioma: si aliquid est totum ad aliquid, remanet totum, si subiecto et

[1] Codex X together with edition 1 adds *there is asked* [quaeritur].
[2] In edition 1 there is added *There* [ibi].
[3] Here in ch. 4, where these words of (St.) Augustine are found: « On account of the natural unity the whole Father is in the Son and Holy Spirit, the whole Holy Spirit, too, is in the Father and the Son. None of These is outside of Any of Them on account of the unity of the Divine Nature ». And in ch. 5, where among all the others (St.) Augustine says: « Therefore, part of the Trinity cannot be any One whomsoever among the Three ». From which words that proposition of the objection seems to have been formed. [Trans. note. In this phrase '*The whole Trinity is in the three*', "the whole Trinity" is said according to the Divine Substance or Essence, inasmuch as that which is God is that which is the Trinity; for strictly speaking None is in Himself; but in a transferred sense in which in each One the same One is reckoned with the Other by circumincession, it

praedicato idem additur; unde si in propositione: tres est totum ad unum, addo vocabulum *persona* ad tres et unum, non alteratur veritas eiusdem.

[6] Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 31. (IV. c. 26.) ait: « Totum dicitur cuius nulla pars eorum abest, ex quibus totum natura (i. e. secundum propriam naturam) dicitur; et quod continet contenta, ut unum quid illa sint; hoc autem dupliciter: aut enim ut unumquodque unum, aut ex his illud unum. Ipsum enim universale et quod omnino ut totum quipiam ens dicitur, sic est universale, ut multa continens, eo quod de singulis praedicatur . . . Ceterum continuum et finitum, cum e pluribus inexistentibus unum quid sit, maxime quidem potentia, non actu ». Quae verba Scotus, Comment. in hunc locum, ita explicat: Et per hoc dat intelligere duplex totum, quatenus tale totum praedicatur de suis partibus, praedicatione dicente: hoc est hoc; aliud totum integrale, quod ex suis partibus constituitur, tamen nulla eius pars est ipsum totum, quia nullum tale totum de suis partibus praedicatur.

[7] Seu libr. I. de Fide c. 2. n. 19; et III. de Spir. S. c. 13. n. 93. ait: Quomodo enim pluralitatem recipit unitas divinitatis, cum pluralitas numeri sit, numerum autem non recipit divina natura?

[8] In cod. M additur *totum.*

can be said. And as regards (St.) Augustine's phrase *'part of the Trinity'* what is denied is the reckoning of a Person in the Trinity as a "part" therefore, since "part" implies imperfection; not that each Person with the Other Two are that Trinity of Persons.] — The Vatican edition here and below at the beginning of the response to this objection, not trusting nearly all the manuscripts and the six first editions, has *Essence* [essentia] in place of *Trinity* [Trinitas]; in place of which codices P and Q have *Divinity* [divinitas].

[4] The Vatican edition without the authority of the manuscripts and six first editions, reads *on the contrary* [contra] for *therefore* [ergo]. — With *therefore* [ergo] the reply to the internal objection begins.

[5] The sense of the argument is: If this axiom is true: 'two things equal remain equal, if to each is added the same thing', this axiom will also be true: 'if anything is a whole to something, it remains the whole, if to the subject and predicate there is added the same thing'; wherefore if in the proposition: '*three* is a whole to *one*', I add the word *person* to "three" and to "one", the truth of it will not be altered.

[6] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 31 (Bk. IV, ch. 26) says: « "Whole" is said of that which no part of them is absent, out of which there is said "the whole by nature" (i. e. according to its own nature); and "that which contains the things contained", as the one which those are; but this in a twofold manner: for either as "anyone thing (is) one", or "out of these that (is) one". For a universal itself and what is entirely said as any whole being, in this manner is a universal, as one containing many, for this, that it is predicated of each . . . Otherwise (whole is) continuous and finite, since from very many things existing within [inexsitentia] there is one 'what', indeed most of all in potency, not in act ». Which words (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in his Commentary on this passage, thus explains: And through this he gives one to understand a twofold "whole", to the extent that such a "whole" is predicated of its own parts, by the predication which says: 'this is this'; the other an integral "whole", which is constituted out of its own parts, yet the whole itself is no part of it, because no such whole is predicated of its own parts.

[7] On the Faith, Bk. I, ch. 2, n. 19; On the Holy Spirit, Bk. II, ch. 13, n. 93 says: For in what manner does the unity of the Divinity receive plurality, since plurality if of a number, but the Divine Nature receives no number?

[8] In codex M there is had *every integral whole* [omne totum integrum] for *everything integral* [omne integrum].

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p. 356

omnino perfectis non resultat tertium:[1] ergo cum in divinis nihil imperfectionis sit ponendum, non est ibi pars: ergo a relativis,[2] nec totum.

entirely perfect (things) there does not result a third:[1] therefore since among the divine nothing must be posited (belonging) to imperfection, there is not a part There:

therefore from relatives,[2] neither a whole.

4. Item, omne totum est maius sua parte; sed ubi infinitas, ibi non est maius et minus: ergo nec totalitas; sed in divinis est infinitas: ergo.

4. Likewise, every whole is greater than its own part; but where (there is) infinity, there is not “greater and lesser”: therefore neither “wholeness”; but among the divine there is infinity: ergo.

5. Item, omne totum est resolubile vel secundum rem, vel secundum intellectum[3] et omne resolubile est corruptibile: ergo cum in Deo nihil sit corruptibile, non erit resolubile, et ita nec totum.

5. Likewise, every whole is can be dissolved again [est resolubile] either according to the thing, and/or according to its understanding [secundum intellectum][3] and everything which can be dissolved again is corruptible: therefore since in God there is nothing corruptible, there will be nothing which can be dissolved again [non erit resolubile], and thus neither a whole.

CONCLUSIO.

Ratio totalitatis, prout exprimit aliquid perfectum, convenit Deo; sed prout habet respectum ad parts, nec totalitas nec partialitas in Deo ponit potest.

CONCLUSION

The reckoning of totality, insofar as it expresses something perfect, befits God; but insofar as it has a regard for parts, neither totality nor partiality can be posited in God.

Respondeo: *Totum* sive totalitas uno modo dicitur absolute; et sic totum idem est quod perfectum.[4] Alio modo dicitur *totum* per comparationem ad partem; et sic dicitur totum quod habet partem et partem sive partes.[5]

I respond: “*Whole*” or “wholeness” is said in one manner absolutely; and thus “whole” is the same as “perfect”.[4] In another manner “*whole*” is said through a comparison to “part”; and thus what has a part and a part or parts is said (to be) the “whole”.[5]

Primo modo bene est ponere *totalitatem* in Deo, secundo[6] non, nec etiam *partialitatem*; totalitatem non, quia aufert simplicitatem; partialitatem non, quia tollit perfectum; neutrum, quia tollit aequalitatem summam.

In the first manner there is rightly [bene] a positing of *wholeness* in God, in the second[6] not, nor even of a *partiality*; of a wholeness not, because it bears off simplicity; of a partiality not, because it takes away the perfect; nor of both [neutrum], because it takes away the most high equality.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Augustino, qui dicit, quod tota Trinitas etc.; dicendum, quod totum accipit pro perfecto, vel totum ibi accipitur privative, quia privat hoc quod est esse partem extra partem. Unde tantum valet *tota essentia*, quantum valet *non habens partem* extra vel intra.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected concerning (St.) Augustine, who says, that the whole Trinity etc.; it must be said, that he accepts “whole” for “the perfect”, and/or “whole” is accepted there privatively, because it deprives [privat] that which it is to be a part outside of a part. Whence “*the whole Essence*” has as much meaning [tantum valet], as “*not having a part* outside and/or inside” does.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod est ibi quantitas virtutis; dicendum, quod quantitas virtutis stat cum summa simplicitate; ideo abstrahit a totalitate et integritate.

2. To that which is objected second, that there is a quantity of virtue There; it must be said, that the quantity of virtue stands still with a most high simplicity; for that reason it abstracts from “totality” and “integrity”.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi

3. To that which is objected, that where

pluralitas, ibi integritas[7] etc.; dicendum quod pluralitas in creaturis duo dicit. Dicit enim aliquorum *distinctionem*, et ex ipsis unius multitudinis[8] *constitutionem*. Primum quidem reperitur in divinis, quia ibi est distinctio vere; secundum non, quia ubi constitutio est, ibi constituentia minus habent quam totum, quod consistuunt, et ita essentialiter differunt ab invicem. In divinis autem non sic, quia cum Pater[9] habeat totam essentiam, non partem, non potest minus habere nec essentialiter differre. Et ideo dicendum, qudo in divinis recipitur[10] *pluralitas* ratione distinctionis. Sed quia *pluralitas* est totum ratione constitutionis, et haec non est in divinis; ideo non sequitur, quod sit ibi *totalitas*; est tamen ibi vere unitas et pluralitas,[11] et *tantum* est in unitate, quantum in pluralitate, sed non *tot modis*. Et quia fides non tantum est respectu essentiae vel magnitudinis, sed etiam modi essendi, patet quod obiicitur, quod non tantum credit qui credit unam personam, quantum qui credit plures.

(there is) plurality, there (is) integrity[7] etc.; it must be said, that “plurality” in creatures means two (things). For it means *a distinction* of some (things), and *a constitution* of one multitude[8] out of them. The first indeed is found among the divine, because there is truly a distinction There; the second (is) not, because where there is a constitution, there the constituents have less than the whole, which they constitute, and thus differ essentially from one another. But among the divine (it is) not so, because since the Father[9] has the whole Essence, not a part, He cannot have less nor differ essentially. And for that reason it must be said, that among the divine “*plurality*” is received[10] according to the reckoning of distinction. But because “*plurality*” is the “whole” by a reckoning of (its) constitution, and this is not among the divine; for that reason it does not follow, that there is a “*totality*” There; and yet there is truly a unity and plurality There[11], and it is *as much* in the Unity, as in the plurality, but not *in all the manners*. And because faith not only is in respect to (God’s) Essence and/or magnitude, but even of (His) manner of being, that which is objected is clear, that he who believes (that there is) one Person does not believe as much, as he who believes (that there are) more.

4. Ex hoc patet sequentia, quia unum est pars trium, secundum quod dicit[12] unitatem, et tria trinitatem. Sed cum additur hoc nomen *persona*, distrahitur et non manet illa ratio unitatis, ideo nec ratio partialitatis.

4. From this the follow (arguments) are clear, because “one” is a part of “three”, according to which (one)[12] means a “unity”, and “three” a “trinity”. But when this name “*person*” is added, it pulls it apart [distrahitur] and that reckoning of unity does not remain, for that reason neither the reckoning of partiality.

5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *praedicatur* simul et *removetur*[13] etc.; dicendum, quod hoc non solum convenit totatlitati respectu partis, sed etiam pluralitati respectu unitatis; quae quamvis non teneat rationem partis[14] propter diminutionem et imperfectionem, tenet tamen rationem unitatis propter principium et distinctionem.

5. 6. To that which is objected, that it is simultaneously *predicated* and *removed*[13] etc.; it must be said, that this not only befits a totality in respect to a part, but even a plurality in respect to a unity; which though it does not have the reckoning of a part[14] on account of (its) diminution and imperfection, yet it does have a reckoning of unity on account of (having a) principle and distinction.

Unde quod totum removeatur a partibus et non[15] differat, hoc non est ratione contitutionis principaliter, sed ratione distinctionis. Et quoniam in divina

Wherefore, that a whole be removed from parts and not[15] differ, this is not principally by reason of a constitution, but by reason of a distinction. And since among the divine

pluralitate, quamvis non sit unius maioris constitutio, quia tamen ibi est distinctio, ideo sic removetur, et sic praedicatur sicut totum in creaturis.

plurality, although there be no constitution of one greater, yet because there is a distinction There, for that reason it is removed in this manner, and is predicated in this manner, just as a "whole" (is) among creatures.

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[1] Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.). Vide supra pag. 311 nota 7.
[2] Id est, concludendo ex habitudine unius relativi ad aliud, nempe partis ad totum.
[3] Vide Anselm., Proslg. c. 18, et de Fide Trin. c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 161 nota 1.
[4] Aristot., III. Phys. text. 64. (c. 6.): Totum vero et perfectum aut omnino idem sunt, aut natura inter se affinia.
[5] Aristot., V. Metaph. text 31. (IV.c. 26.). Vide supra arg. 5. ad opp.
[6] In codd. V X satis bene additur *vero modo*. Paulo infra cod. X *perfectionem* pro *perfectum*. Dein ed. 1 post *neutrum*, *quia* bene addit *utrumque*.
[7] Ex cod. Y supplevimus *integritas*.
[8] Ita plures mss. ut F G H P Q Y cum ed. 1; alii cum Vat. *multiplicationis*.
[9] Cod. O *quaelibet persona* loco *Pater*.
[10] Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *recipitur* pro *reperitur*, et paulo infra ex pluribus mss. ut A C S T V ee et ed. 1 *haec* pro *hoc*. Multi codd. ut A F G H I S T V Z etc. cum ed. 1 *erat totum* loco *est totum*.
[11] Vat.cum cod. cc *est tamen naturae unitas et personarum pluralitas*, sed obstat auctoritas aliorum mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra multi codd. cum Vat. *Sed quia* loco *Et quia* contra codd. G H et ed. 1.
[12] Supple cum ed. 1 *unum*, quae et mox ponit *adderetur* pro *additur*.
[13] Ita brevissime mss. et ed. 1, dum Vat. *obiicitur quod omne, quod praedicatur simul et de nullo* etc. *Et ad sequens: omne quod removetur* etc.
[14] Cod. Z incongrue hic addit *scilicet in divinis*, et mox post *imperfectionem* adiungut *quam scilicet dicit pars*.
[15] Vat. perperam, quia argumentationi minus respondet, et absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit *non*. Argumentationis summa in hoc est: ratio, quare *totum* i. e. Trinitas removetur a Patre, nec tamen ab ipso differt sicut totum a partibus, non est, quod Trinitas sit maius aliquid quam Pater (una siquidem essentia est in tribus), sed quod ibi est realis distinctio personarum.

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[1] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 49 (Bk. VI, c. 13). See above, d. 17, p. II, a. sole, q. 2, p. 311, footnote 7.
[2] That is, by concluding from the habitude of one relative to the other, namely of a part to a whole.
[3] See (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury), Proslogion, ch. 18, and On Faith in the Trinity, ch. 3. Cf. above d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, pl. 161, footnote 1.
[4] Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text 64 (ch. 6): However the "whole" and the "perfect" either are entirely the same, or by nature border on one another [natura inter se affinia].
[5] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 31 (Bk. IV, ch. 6): See above the 5th initial argument.
[6] In codices V and X there is sufficiently added *manner, however,* [vero modo]. A little below this codex X has *perfection* [perfectionem] for *the perfect* [perfectum]. Then edition 1 after *nor of both, because* [neutrum, quia] adds *each* [utrumque].
[7] From codex Y we have supplied *integrity* [integritas].
[8] Thus very many manuscripts, such as F G H P Q and Y, together with edition 1; others, together with the Vatican edition, have *multiplication* [multiplicationis].
[9] Codex O has *any Person* [quaelibet persona] in place of *the Father* [Pater].
[10] Trusting the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *is received* [recipitur] for *is found* [reperitur], and a little below this from very many manuscripts, such as A C S T V and ee, and edition 1, *this (constitution)* [haec] for *this (genus of plurality)* [hoc]. Many codices, such as A F G H I S T V Z etc., together with edition 1, read *was the "whole"* [erat totum] in place of *is the "whole"* [est totum].
[11] The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *there is, however, a unity of nature and a plurality of Persons* [est tamen naturae unitas et personarum pluralitas], but the authority of the other manuscripts and edition 1 withstand this. A little below this many codices together with the Vatican edition have *But because* [Sed quia] in place of *And because* [Et quia], contrary to codices G and H and to edition 1.
[12] Supply together with edition 1 *one* [unum], which also next puts *would be added* [adderetur] for *is added* [additur].
[13] Thus read most briefly the manuscripts and edition 1, while the Vatican edition has *that everything, which is predicated together and of nothing etc.. And to the following: everything which is removed etc*. [obiicitur quod omne, quod praedicatur simul et de nullo etc. Et ad sequens: omne quod removetur etc.].
[14] Codex Z incongruously adds here *namely, among the divine* [scilicet in divinis], and next after *imperfection* [imperfectionem] inserts *which,*

namely, means a "part" [quam scilicet dicit pars].

[15] The Vatican edition faultily, because it corresponds less with the argumentation, and without the authority of the manuscripts and six first editions, omits *not* [non]. A summary of this argument is: the reason, for which the "*whole*", i.e. the Trinity, is removed from the Father, and yet does not differ from Him, as a whole does from its parts, is not, that the Trinity is something more than the Father (as if there is one Essence among Three), but that there is a real distinction There of the Persons.

SCHOLION.

I. Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis notandum, quod S. Doctor hic in corp. et ad 1. verbum *totum* sumit triplici modo. Potest enim intelligi vel *positive* vel *privative*; si positive, tunc iterum vel *proprie* i. e. comparative ad partes, et sic *totum* est idem ac *habens partes*; vel *absolute*, et sic significat perfectum. Si autem accipitur *privative*, tunc significat ens, quod non habet partes, sicut sunt omnia indivisibilia v. g. anima. In primo sensu *totum* minime potest transferri ad Deum, bene vero in secondo ac tertio sensu. His suppositis, quaestio resolvitur quoad *totalitatem* duplici conclusione; deinde negativa solutio extenditur etiam ad *partialitatem*.

II. Pro intelligentia 3. 5. et 6. oppositi et solutionis notandum, quod natura *totius integralis* importat, quod totum praediceetur de omnibus partibus simul, sed de nulla parte per se. Ratio huius est non tantum, quia *distinguuntur* partes, sed etiam quia totum est *inaequale* in comparatione ad suas partes. Verum quidem est, quod etiam *Trinitas* non praedicatur de aliqua persona per se, tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod Trinitas sit totum integrale relate ad singulas personas, quia non propter aliquam *inaequalitatem* Trinitatis ad singulas personas, sed solummodo propter *distinctionem* personarum ista praedicatio fieri nequit. Unde recte replicatur in 3. oppos.: « Illa pluralitas (personarum) non integratur (i. e. non facit totum integrum), quia nihil plus est in tribus quam in uno ».

SCHOLIUM

I. For an understanding of this question it must be noted, that the Seraphic Doctor here in the body (of the question) and in reply to n. 1, takes the word "*whole*" [totum] in three senses. For it can be understood either *positively* and/or *privatively*; if positively, then again either *properly*, i. e. comparatively to the parts, and thus a "*whole*" is the same as the "*one having parts*"; and/or *absolutely*, and thus it signifies the "perfect". But if it is accepted *privatively*, then it signifies a being, which does not have parts, just as are all indivisibles, v. g. the soul. In the first sense "*whole*" can least of all be transferred to God, but rightly so [bene] in the second and third sense. With these things supposed, the question is resolved in regard to "*wholeness*" [totalitatem] with a twofold conclusion; then the negative solution is extended even to "*partiality*".

II. For an understanding of nn. 3, 4 and 5, in the Contrary and the Solution, it must be noted, that the nature of an *integral whole* [totius integralis] conveys, that the whole is predicated of all the parts together, but of not part by itself [per se]. The reason for this is not only, that the parts *are distinguished*, but also that the whole is *unequal* in comparison to its own parts. Indeed, it is true, that even the *Trinity* is not predicated of any Person by Himself, yet from this there does not follow, that the Trinity is an integral whole in a manner related [relate] to Each Person, because not on account of any *inequality* of the Trinity to Each Person, but only on account of the *distinction* of the Persons is that predication (of an "integral whole" to the Trinity) unable to be made. Whence there is rightly stated

Sic etiam verba in solutione: « Ubi constitutio est, ibi constituentia minus habent quam totum », facile intelliguntur, quia manifestum est, quod quando partes constituunt unum totum, partes minus sunt quam totum. In divinis non est sic, quia pluralitas personarum non constituit *totum*, ut ibi a S. Doctor bene explicatur.

[replicatur] in the 3rd initial argument: « That plurality (of Persons) is not integrated (i. e. does not make an integral whole), because there is nothing more in Three, that in One ». So also the words in the solution: « Where there is a constitution, there the constituents have less than the whole », are easily understood, because it is manifest, that when parts constitute one whole, the parts are less than the whole. Among the divine it is not so, because the plurality of the Persons does not constitute the *Whole*, as is well explained there by the Seraphic Doctor.

Pro solut. ad 4. notandum, quod numerus in divinis non habet plenam rationem numeri, quia etsi personae sunt distinctae per suas personales proprietates, tamen conveniunt in una numero esentia; sed numerus secundum plenam sui rationem importat numeratorum distinctionem in essenita. Unde tres unitates personales sunt quidem plures quam una, non tamen sunt plures vel plus *in essentia*; ita fere Richard. a Med., loc. infra cit. et ad mentem Seraphici Doctoris, cfr. infra d. 24. praecipue a. 3. q. 1.

For the solution to the reply to n. 4, it must be noted, that “number” among the divine does not have the full reckoning of a “number”, because even is the Persons are distinct through Their personal properties, yet They convene in one Essence according to number; but “number” according to its full reckoning conveys a distinction in essence of those numbered. Wherefore three personal unities are indeed more than one, yet they are not more and/or a more *in essence*; thus nearly Richard of Middleton, loc. cit. below, and according to the mind of the Seraphic Doctor, cf. below d. 24, chiefly a. 3, q. 1.

III. Scot., de hac q. et duabus seqq. Report. hic q. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 12; S. p. I. tr. 11. q. 47. m. 1. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 3. et 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3.q. 1 — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 43. q. 1. a. 4. — Durand., de hac 1. et 4. q. hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3.

III. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on this q. and the following two qq., Reportatio, here in q. 5. — St. Thomas, here in q. 4, a. 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 12; Summa., p. I, tr. 11, q. 47, m. 1, incidental question. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3 and 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st, princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 43, q. 1, a. 4. — Durandus, on this 1st and 4th q., here in a. 4. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here in q. 3.

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atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

PARS II.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 357-360.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum in divinis possit poni totum univerale.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum in divinis sit ponere totum univerale. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Damascenum,[1] qui dicit, « quod in divinis commune est, ut substantia, particulare, ut atomus »: ergo si est ibi commune et particulare, ergo universale, quia particulari non respondet aliud commune quam universale.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per definitionem[2] universalis et particularis. « Univerale enim est quod praedicatur de pluribus; particulare de uno solo »; sed has rationes est invenire in divinis: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod est in plus et est univocum, est universale ad illa, respectu quorum est in plus;[3] sed essentia sive substantia est in plus quam persona, et in plus univocum, quia[4] dicit unam naturam repertam in illis secundum identitatem: ergo etc.

& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX

PART II

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 357-360.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 2

Whether among the divine there can be posited a universal whole.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether among the divine there is a positing of a universal whole. And that (it is) so, seems:

1. Through (St. John) Damascene,[1] who says, « that among the divine the common is, as substance, the particular, as an atom »: therefore if there is a common and a particular There, therefore a universal, because to the particular there does not respond a common other than a universal.

2. Likewise, this very (thing) seems through the definition[2] of "universal" and "particular": « For the "universal" is that which is predicated of many; the "particular" of one alone »; but it is that one find these reckonings among the divine: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, everything which is in more and is univocal, is universal to those, in respect of which it is in more;[3] but the Essence or Substance is in more than a Person, and (is) univocal in more, because[4] It means the one Nature found in Them according to identity: ergo etc..

4. Item, in divinis est communicabile et incommunicabile; aut ergo *eodem*, aut *alio* et *alio*. Non *eodem*; quia illud non est intelligibile, quod ex eodem veniat communitas et proprietas, convenientia et differentia formaliter,[5] ergo *alio* et *alio*: ergo si alio est communicabile, alio incommunicabile, ergo cum communicabile sit ratione eius *quo est*, incommunicabile ratione eius *quod est*, ergo *quo est* et *quod est* in divinis sunt per differentiam; sed ubi haec sunt per differentiam, ibi est universale et particulare: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, among the divine there is the communicable and the incommunicable; therefore, either (these are) *by the same reckoning* [eodem], or by *one* and *another (reckoning)*. Not *by the same* (reckoning); because it is not intelligible, that from the same (reckoning) there comes community and property, convenience and difference formally;[5] therefore by *one* and *another* (reckonings): therefore if by one (reckoning) it is communicable, by another incommunicable, therefore since the communicable is by a reckoning of that *whereby it is* [quo est], the incommunicable by a reckoning of that *which it is* [quod est], therefore *that whereby it is* and *that which it is* among the divine are through a difference; but where these are through difference, there is a universal and a particular: ergo etc..

5. Item, quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto universalius;[6] sed divina essentia est simplicissima: ergo ibi maxime est ratio universalis.

5. Likewise, as much as anything (is) more simple, so much (is it) more universal;[6] but the Divine Essence is most simple: therefore There the reckoning of the universal is in the greatest manner.

Contra: 1. Boethius[7] dicit, quod nec est universale nec particulare.

On the contrary: 1. (St. Severinus) Boethius[7] says, that it is neither universal nor particular.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*, quia ubicumque est universale, ibi est una forma multiplicabilis vel multiplicata;[8] in cuius rei signum *omne*, . . .

2. Likewise, this very (thing) seems *by reason*, because wheresoever there is a universal, there is one form, multipliable and/or multiplied;[8] as the sign of which thing (the word) "*every*", . . .

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[1] Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 9. In quo textu Vat. contra mss. et ed. 3 habet *Antonius* pro *atomus*.
[2] Vat. cum cod. cc *distinctionem*, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 exhibentibus *definitionem*, quae sumta est ex Aristot., I. Periher. c. 5. (c. 7.).
[3] Haec definitio univeralis colligitur ex Aristot., II. Poster. c. 14. (c. 12.). Vide supra p. I. huius d. q. 4. arg. 1 ad opp.
[4] Fide codd. K T Z substituimus *quia* pro ambiguo *quod*.
[5] Antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 lectionem *formaliter* pro *personalis* restituimus, quae certe melior est.
[6] Cfr. Libr. de Causis, prop. 4. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum uno alterove codice minus bene *maxima*; plures codd. ut A F H ee ff omittunt *est*.
[7] Libr. de Trin. c. 1. et 2, ubi haec propositio sententialiter sive tanquam conclusio continentur; ostendit siquidem ibi Boethius, quod propter summam substantialem Dei indifferentiam seu unitatem et simplicitatem « nulla in eo sit diversitas, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo, atque idcirco nec numerus », ex quibus

[1] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. III, ch. 6. See here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 9. In which text the Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 3, has *Anthony* [Antonius] for *an atom* [atomus].
[2] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has *distinction* [distinctionem], yet with the other codices and edition 1 exhibiting the *definition* [definitionem], which has been taken from Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 5 (ch. 7).
[3] This definition of a universal is gathered from Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 14 (ch. 12). See above p. I, of this distinction, q. 4, 1st argument in the Contrary.
[4] Trusting in codices K T and Z, we have substituted *because* [quia] for the ambiguous *because/which/that* [quod].
[5] We have restored the certainly better of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, of putting *difference formally* [differentia formaliter] for *personal difference* [differentia personalis].
[6] Cf. Book on Causes, proposition 4. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition, together with

praedicta propositio consequitur. Vide Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 1. — Mox codd. F G post *quod* satis bene addunt *in divinis*, codd. H M vero *Deus*.
[8] Sub hoc prespectu Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 45. (VI. c. 13.) universale definit: quod pluribus natura inesse natum est. [Trans. nota: haec nota continue legit in pag. sequentem.]

one or the other codex, has less well *the greatest* [maxima] for *in the greatest manner* [maxime]; very many codices, such as A F H ee and ff, omit *is* [est].
[7] On the Trinity, chs. 1 and 2, where this proposition is contained notionally [sententialiter] or as a conclusion; since (St. Severinus) Boethius shows there, that on account of the most high un-differing-ness [indifferentia] of God's Substance or unity or simplicity, « there is no diversity in Him, no plurality out of a diversity, no multitude of accidents, and on that account neither number », out of which the aforesaid proposition is the consequent. See Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 1. — Next codices F and G after *that* [quod] add sufficiently well *among the divine* [in divinis], but codices H and M add *God* [Deus] for *it*.
[8] Under this respect Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 45 (Bk. VI, ch. 13) defines "universal": that which is bound to be in many according to nature. [Trans. note: this footnote, to the extent that it concerns what follows, continues on the next page.]

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quod significat *quoniam universaliter*, potest addi omni universali; sed in Deo non est una forma vel natura multiplicabilis nec multiplicata nec recipit signum univesale, ut dicatur *omnis Deus*. ergo etc.

because it signifies "*since in a universal manner*", can be added to every universal; but in God there is not one multipliable Form and/or Nature, nor One multiplied, nor does It receive a universal sign, so that there be said "*every God*": ergo etc..

3. Item, ubi est particulare, ibi est forma vel natura ut *hic et nunc*;[1] sed divina natura sive in se, sive in hypostasibus non est *hic et nunc*, sed semper et ubique: ergo nec in se nec in hypostasibus est ibi particulare.

3. Likewise, where there is a particular, there is a form and/or nature as a "*here and now*"; but the Divine Nature, whether in Itself, or in the Hypostases, is not a "*here and now*"; but an "always and everywhere": therefore neither in Itself nor in the Hypostases is a particular There.

4. Item, ubi est particulare et universale, universale est simplicius particulari:[2] ergo cum in Deo non sit simplicior essentia quam persona, quia in persona nullum est accidens, nullum principium constitutivum: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, where there is a particular and a universal, the universal is more simple than the particular:[2] therefore since in God the Essence is not more simple than a Person, because in a Person there is no accident, no constitutive principle: ergo etc..

5. Item, omnis natura, in qua est univesale et particulare, est in genere determinato, et omnis talis est limitata:[3] ergo cum divina natura sit infinita, patet etc.

5. Likewise, every nature, in which there is a universal and a particular, is in a determinate genus, and every such (nature) is limited:[3] therefore since the Divine Nature is infinite, it is clear etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Licet in divinis sit ratio communis et proprii, comunicabilis et incommunicabilis, minime tamen ibi est ratio universalis et particularis.

CONCLUSION

Though among the divine there is a reckoning of "common" and "proper", of "communicable" and "incommunicable", yet least of all is there a reckoning of "universal" and" particular".

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum

I **respond:** For an understanding of the

intelligentiam est notandum, quod, cum fides nostra[4] ponat trinitatem et unitatem in divinis, necessario ponit convenientiam et distinctionem. Et quia convenientia non est nisi in communicabili a pluribus[5] et communi, distinctio autem non est nisi in proprio et incommunicabili, necessario in divinis ponitur ratio *communis* et *proprii*, *communicabilis* et *incommunicabilis*.

aforesaid it must be noted, that, since our[4] Faith posits a trinity and a unity among the Divine (Persons), it necessarily posits a convening [convenientiam] and a distinction. And because the convening is not but in (something) communicable by Many[5] and common, but the distinction is not but in (something) proper and incommunicable, there is necessarily posited among the Divine (Persons) a reckoning of the *common* and *proper*, the *communicable* and *incommunicable*.

Sed cum in Deo et[6] creaturis sit distinctio suppositorum, aliter est in Deo quam in creaturis. Distinctio enim suppositorum maior est quam distinctio accidentalis; unde quamvis innotescat per accidentia,[7] tamen non fit per accidentia. Accidentibus enim circumscriptis, adhuc est intelligere supposita differe; et cum non fiat per accidentia consequentia,[8] oportet quod fiat ab *origine* vel ab *originali principio*. Ab *origine* est, quando unum differt ab altero, quia emanat ab eo; idem enim a se emanare non potest. Talis distinctio suppositorum est in Deo, sed haec[9] non potest esse in creatura, scilicet distinctio solum per originem; nam nulla creatura potest alteri totam suam essentiam dare. Si ergo dat partem, necesse est, quod alia differentia sit ibi quam originis; et ideo est differentia ab *orginali principio*. Haec autem non est *forma* in se, quia dicit quid communicabile,[10] nec *materia* in se, quia dicit quid indistinctum:[11] ergo hoc facit *forma, ut adveniens materia*. Quia enim adveniens materiae accipit partem, non totam[12] materiam, hinc est, quod ipsam distinguit, et ipsam distinguendo trahi- / -tur . . .

But since in God and[6] creatures there is a distinction of supposits, it is otherwise in God than in creatures. For the distinction of supposits is greater than an accidental distinction; whence although it come to be known through accidents,[7] yet it does not come to be through accidents. For with accidents set aside [circumscriptis], there is still an understanding that supposits differ; and since (this) does not come to be through consequent accidents,[8] it is bound that it come to be from (their) *origin* and/or from (their) *original principle*. It is from (their) *origin*, when one differs from the other, because it emanates from it; for the same cannot emanate from itself. Such a distinction of supposits is in God, but this[9] cannot be in a creature, that is, a distinction solely through an origin; for no creature can give its own essence whole to another. If, therefore, it gives a part, it is necessary, that there be another difference there than (that) of the origin; and for this reason there is a difference from an *original principle*. But this is not the *form* in itself, because (the form) means something communicable,[10] nor (is it) the *matter* in itself, because (that) means something indistinct:[11] therefore this (original principle) causes *the form, to (be as) one coming upon the matter*. For because as one coming upon matter it accepts a part, not the whole[12] matter, hence it is, that it distinguishes that, and by distinguishing it is / drawn . . .

— Mox addendo coniunctionem *quoniam* praestamus lectionem mss. et ed. 1, quam genuinam iudicamus, quia respondet verbis Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.) et ibid. II. c. 1 (c. 10): [illegible] et versioni a Boethio factae (qua et schola et in specie S. Doctor uti solebant): *Omnis* enim non universale

— Next by adding the conjunction *since* [quoniam] we offer the reading of the manuscripts and edition 1, which we judge to be the genuine one, because it corresponds to the words of Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 5 (ch. 7), and Bk. II, ch. 1 (ch. 10) : [illegible] and to the Latin

significat, sed *quoniam universaltier* (ed.Migne, Patrol. lat. tom. 64. col. 322 et 348). Vide Nicolaum de Orbeliis O. Min. (floruit circa 1450) in Expositione logicae supra textum Mag. Petri Hispani, c. de Propositione.

[1] Porphyr., de Praedicab., individuum seu particulare definit: « Cuius collectio proprietatum nunquam in alio quolibet eadem erit ». Inter has proprietates principatum obtinent *locus* et *tempus*. Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 1, qui *loco* principatum dat et Aristot., I. Post. c. 24. (c. 31), qui et *loci* et *temporis* mentionem facit ac de universali per oppositionem ad particulare iuxta translationem Boethii haec adiungit: Universale autem, quod est in omnibus, impossibile est sentire; neque enim hoc aliquid est neque *nunc* neque *ubi* (□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□); neque enim utique esset universale; quod enim semper est et ubique, universale dicimus esse. — Ultima verba intelligas de perpetuitate et ubiquitate *negativa* i. e. illa que abstrahit ab omni determinato tempore et loco; non autem de *positiva* i. e. illa quae se extendit ad omnia tempora et loca, et quae soli divinae naturae per se singulari (neutiquam universali) convenit, de qua in hoc agitur argumento. — Codd. L O *ibi est materia et forma* loco *ibi est forma vel natura*.

[2] Vide Porphyr., de Praedicab., c. de Specie et Differentia, et Aristot., I. Poster. c. 20. (c. 24), ubi ex hoc deducit, demonstrationem universalem esse praestantiorem particulari.

[3] Cf. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 4.

[4] Ed. 1 *vera* pro *nostra*.

[5] Intellige haec verba in senus passivo, ita ut sensus sit: nisi in aliquo, quod aptum est communicari seu haberi a pluribus. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit *a*.

[6] Vat. repetit hic *in*, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1.

[7] Alluditur ad supra in 3. fundam. a nobis allatam definitionem individui. Collectio accidentalium proprietatum, quibus individuum nobis innotescat, hoc versu continetur: Forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen.

[8] Ed. 1 *consequenter*, in qua lectio interpunctionem mutes necesses est. Paulo infra post *ab altero* in ed. 1 additur *solum*.

[9] Ex pluribus mss. ut A T Y etc. substituims *haec* pro *hoc*. — De ratione, quam S. Doctor hic affert, plura vide supra d. 9. q. 1.

[10] Sensum istorum verborum accipe a S. Doctor, II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., ubi fusius de principio individuationis agit: « Rursus, quomodo forma sit tota et praecipua causa numeralis distinctionis, valde difficile est capere; cum omnis forma creata, quantum est de sui natura, *nata sit habere aliam sibi similem*, sicut et ipse Philosophus (VII. Metaph. text. 55. — ed. Paris, VI. c. 15.) dicit, etiam in sole et luna esse ». — Idem dicit S. Thomas de formis materialibus seu per se non substistentibus, in Comment. super VII. Metaph. lec. 15. et in opusculo de Individuatione. — Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3. ante *communicabile* supplevimus *quid*.

[11] Sub hoc respectu Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.) materiam describit: Dico autem materiam, quae per se ipsam neque quid neque quantum nec

translation authored by (St. Severinus) Boethius (which both the Scholastics and especially the Seraphic Doctor were accustomed to use): For "*every*" does not signify "universal", but "*since in a universal manner*" [*Omnis* enim non universale significat, sed *quoniam universaltier*], cf. Migne's, Patrologia Latina, tome 64, col. 322 and 348). See Nicholaus de Orbeliis, O. Min., (fl. c. A. D. 1450), in Expositione logicae supra textum Magistri Petri Hispani, ch. "On Proposition".

[1] Porphyry, On the Predicables, defines "individual" or "particular": « The collection of which properties shall never be the same in any other ». Among these properties *time* and *place* hold the first place. Cf. (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 1, who gives to *place* the fisrt place, and Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 24 (ch. 31), who makes mentions both of *place* and *time* and concerning the universale through opposition to the particular, according to the translation of (St.) Boethius, adjoins these words: Moreover the universal, which is in all, is impossible to sense; for it is neither "this something" nor the "*here* and *now*" (□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□) [Trans. note: for clarity, here the English translation follows the Greek for *here and now* (□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ rather than Boethius's Latin *now and where* (nunc neque ubi)]; for indeed, neither would be a universal; for what is "always and everywhere", we say is universal. — Understand these last words of a *negative* perpetuity and ubiquity, i. e. that which abstracts from every determined time and place; and not of *positive* (perpetuity and ubiquity), i. .e. that which extends itself to all times and places, and which befits the Divine Nature alone by Itself as a singular (by no means as a "universal"), which is dealt with in this argument. — Codices L and O read *there is matter and form* [ibi est materia et forma] in place if *there is a form and/or nature* [ibi est forma vel natura].

[2] See Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. "On Species and Difference", and Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, ch. 29 (ch. 24), where from this he deduces, that a universal demonstration is more excellent [praestantiorem] than a particular one.

[3] Cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 4.

[4] Edition 1 reads *the True* [vera] for *our* [nostra].

[5] Understand these word in the passive sense, such that their sense be: "except in something, which is apt to be communicated or to be had by Many". — The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions, reads *to/for Many* [pluribus] for *by Many* [a pluribus].

[6] The Vatican edition repeats here an *in* [in], which however is lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.

[7] An allusion to the definition of "individual" cited by us above in the 3rd. argument of the fundament. The collection of accidental properties, by which an individual makes itself known to us, is contained in this saying: "Form, figure, place, time, origin, fatherland, name" [Forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen].

[8] Edition 1 has *accidents, consequently* [accidentia consequenter] for *consequent accidents* [accidentia consequentia]. A little below this after *from the*

aliquid aliud quippiam dicitur, quibus ens determinatur. Vide etiam I. Metaph. text. 17. (c. 8), ubi ait: Quando namque nihil erat discretum (translat. arabico-latia: Quoniam autem in fundamento naturae *non est aliquid distinctum*), palam quia nihil erat verum dicere de substantia illa . . . nec enim quale aliquid id possibile esse nec quantum nec quid.

[12] In Vat. male omititur *totam*, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1, a quibus etiam, uno alterove tantum codice excepto, paulo infra lectio Vat. *trahit* loco *trahitur* emendatur.

other [ab altero] in edition 1 there is added *only* [solum].

[9] From very many manuscripts, such as A T Y etc., we have substituted *this (distinction)* [haec] for *this* [hoc]. On the reason which the Seraphic Doctor offers here, see more above in d. 9, q. 1.

[10] Accept the sense of these words of his from the Seraphic Doctor, Sent, Bk. II, d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3 in the body (of the question), where he deals more at length with the principle of individuation: « Again, in what manner a form is whole and the chief cause of the distinction of number, is very difficult to grasp; since every created form, as much as it concerns its own nature, *is born to have another similar to itself*, just as the Philosopher (Metaphysics, Bk VII, text 55 — Parisian edition, Bk. VI, ch. 15) also says, that there is (a multipliable form) in the Sun and the Moon ».

[11] Under this respect Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 8 (Bk. VI, ch. 3) describes “matter”: Moreover, I say “matter” is that “which is said through its very self (to be) neither a “what” nor a quantum nor some other something, by which s being [ens] is determined”. See also Metaphysics, Bk. I, text 17 (ch. 8), where he says: For indeed, when nothing had been discerned (the Arabic-Latin translation reads: Moreover, since in the fundament of nature *there is not anything distinct*), openly, because there was nothing true to say of that substance . . . for neither (is it) something of the kind that is possible nor (is it) a quantum nor a “what”.

[12] In the Vatican edition there is badly omitted *whole* [totam], which however is extant in the manuscripts and edition 1, from which also, with the exception of only one or the other codex, we have emended the reading of the Vatican edition, which put *it draws* [trahit] in place of *is drawn* [trahitur].

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p. 359

trahi- / -tur in partem et limitatur et fit *hic et nunc* et unum numero et particulare.

is / drawn into part (of the matter) and is limited and becomes a “*here and now*” and a “one in number” and a “particular”.

Quoniam igitur in divinis non est additio ad materiam nec tractio in[1] partem, ideo non cadit in divinis universale nec particulare, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae in opponendo.

Therefore, since among the divine there is no addition to matter nor a being-drawn [tractio] into[1] a part, for that reason among the divine there does not occur a universal nor a particular, just as the reasons for this, brought forward in opposition, show.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Damasceno, dicendum, quod improprie dicitur *particulare* pro *incommunicabili*.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected concerning (St. John) Damascene, it must be said, that “*particular*” is said improperly for the “*incommunicable*”.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod universale est quod praedicatur de pluribus; dicendum, quod ista est ratio *communicabilis*; *universalis* autem non est, nisi secundum quod realiter intelligitur multiplicari[2] in illis. Similiter solvendum de particulari.

2. To that which is objected, that the universal is that which is predicated of many; it must be said, that that (definition) is the reckoning of *the communicable*, but is not (that) of *the universal*, except according to which it is really understood to be multiplied[2] in them. Similarly must it be

solved concerning the particular.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est in plus et est univocum etc.; dicendum, quod universale est in plus, ita quod simplicius, et fit in[3] minus per additionem ad illud; non autem sic in Deo.

3. To that which is objected, that it is in more and is univocal etc.; it must be said, that the universal is in more, such that (it is) more simple, and it comes to be in[3] less through being added [additionem] to it; but not so (is it) in God.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum eodem sit[4] communicabile et incommunicabile; dicendum, quod alio et alio; quia, sicut dicit Augustinus,[5] « alio est Deus, et alio Pater »; sed non alio et alio secundum *rem*, sed secundum *rationem*: quia deitate est Deus, paternitate Pater, et paternitas non est aliud *re* ab essentia, quoniam paternitas est essentia; est tamen aliud *ratione*. Et quia ablativus dicit ratione, ideo non eodem est Deus, quo Pater.[6] — *Et si obiicias*: aut rationi illi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil; dicendum, quod ratio illa per comparationem ad *essentiam* non est nisi modus, sed per compartationem ad aliam *peronam* est res. Et hoc patet, quoniam *habere essentiam ab alio* et *non habere* non dicit rem aliam, sed solum modum; *habere* autem *ab alio* et *habere non ab alio* dicit realem differentiam, quia nulla res est a se et ab alio.[7]

4. To that which is asked, whether the communicable and the incommunicable (in God) is[4] by the same (reckoning); it must be said, that (these are) by one and another (reckoning); because, just as (St.) Augustine[5] says, « by one He is God, and by another the Father »; but not by one and by another, according to *thing*, but according to a *reckoning*: because by the Deity He is God, by the paternity the Father, and the paternity is *according to thing* not other than the Essence, since the paternity is the Essence; and yet (it is) other *according to reckoning*. And because the ablative (case) means according to a reckoning, for that reason He is not God by the same, according to which (He is) the Father.[6] — *And if you object*: that either something in the thing [in re] responds to that reckoning, or nothing; it must be said, that that reckoning through a comparison to the Essence, is naught, but a manner (of being regarded), but through a comparison to the other *Person* it is a thing. And this is clear, since “*to have an essence from another*” and *“to not have it (from another)*” do not mean another thing, but only (another) manner (of having); but “*to have it from another*” and “*to have it not from another*” mean a real difference, because no thing is from itself and from another.[7]

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de simplici, dicendum, quod est simplex *possibile ad additionem*, et tali modo universale est simplex; alio modo simplex, quia *privat compositionem* et additionem, et haec repugnantia non consonat universalitati; et tali modo divina essentia est simplex, quae nullo modo trahibilis est in partem per additionem, sicut trahitur universale; et ideo non est universale.

5. To that which is objected last concerning the simple, it must be said, that there is a simple *capable of being added* [possible ad additionem], and in such a manner a universal is simple; in another manner (there is) a simple, because *it deprives composition* and addition, and this repugnance is not consonant with universality; and in such a manner the Divine Essence is simple, which in no manner is able to be drawn [trahibilis] into a part through being added [per additionem], just as a universal is drawn in; and for that reason It is not a universal.

SCHOLION.

I. Sententia communis affirmat, in divinis

SCHOLIUM

I. The common sentence affirms, that

esse quidem rationem *communis* et *proprii*, minime vero rationem *univeralis* et *particularis*, sive speciei et individui. Unde notanda est differentia inter *universale* et *commune*, *particulare* et *proprium* sive *incommunicabile*. Licet enim omne universale sit commune, non tamen omne commune est universale. *Universale* enim praedicabile, de quo est hic sermo, opponitur particulari, « quod ut dicit Alex. Hal., eo dicitur, quod partem capiat communis naturae », et est aliquod superius, quod per differentias contrahi potest ad sua inferiora, ita ut in eis realiter multiplicetur. *Commune* vero in genere est unum in pluribus; quod dupliciter potest esse, scil. vel multiplicatum in pluribus, et tunc idem est ac universale; vel non multiplicatum, ut essentia divina, quae una est in tribus personis (cfr. supra d. 5. dub. 2.). In hoc sensu speciali *commune* retinet nomen genericum et distinguitur ab *universali*.

among the divine there is indeed a reckoning of *common* and *proper*, however least of all a reckoning of *universal* and *particular*, nor of *species* and *individual*. Wherefore it must be noted that there is a difference between *universal* and *common*, *particular* and *proper* or *incommunicable*. For though every universal is common, however, not every common is universal. For a *universal* predicable, with which this discourse concerns itself, is opposed to the particular (predicable), « because », as Alexander of Hales says, « it is said for this, that it grasps part of the common nature », and is something superior, which can be contracted through differences to its inferiors, so that in them it is really multiplied. However (what is) *common* in genus is “one among many”; which can be said in a twofold manner, that is, either as “one multiplied among many”, and then it is the same as the universal; and/or as “one not multiplied (among many)”, such as (is) the Divine Essence, which is One (Essence) among the Three Persons (cf. above d. 5, dubium 2). In this special sense *common* retains the generic name and is distinguished from *universal*.

II. Pro explicatione ampliore haec referimus ex Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit.): « In Deo non est ponere esse universale, nec esse singulare vel particulare; habet tamen esse divinum de utroque quod est perfectionis. *Universale* enim est in multis et dicitur de multis, quia non est totum, quod sunt singularia, sicut homo non dicit totum, quod est Socrates, sicut quantitatem et qualitatem et operationem, quae tamen sunt in esse Socratis . . . Sed cum dicitur Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus, dicitur esse divinum *in* multis, sed non *de* multis. Cum enim dico *Deus*, dico totum esse Patris, totum esse Filii. Esse ergo *de* multis imperfectionis est in esse universali, unde non convenit esse divino; sed esse *in* multis convenit, quia hoc est virtutis et nobilitatis ».

II. For a fuller explanation we cite these words from Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., below): « In God there is no positing of universal ‘being’ [esse universale], nor of singular and/or particular ‘being’: however the Divine ‘Being’ has from each what belongs to perfection. For the “*universal*” is among many and is said of many [de multis], because it is not the whole, which the singulars are, just as “man” is not said to be the whole, which Socrates is, such as (his) quantity and quality and operation, which are yet in the ‘being’ of Socrates . . . But when there is said “God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit”, the Divine ‘Being’ is said (to be) *in* Many, but not *of* Many [de multis]. For when I say “*God*”, I say the whole ‘Being’ of the Father, the whole ‘Being’ of the Son. Therefore ‘to be *of* many’ belongs to imperfection in universal ‘being’, whence it does not befit the Divine ‘Being’; but ‘to be *in* many’ does befit It, because this belongs to virtue and nobility ».

« Similiter *particulare* dicitur quod est in uno solo; non tamen est de multis. Quod non sit

« Similarly the “*particular*” is said (to be) that which is “in one alone”; however it is

de multis perfectionis est, quia dicit totum esse; sed in uno solo imperfectionis est, quia nobilius est esse in multis quam in uno. Ideo esse divinum est in multis, non in uno solo, esse, inquam, in multis *non multiplicatum, sed unum*. — Item est loqui de particulari sive individuo tribus modis: uno modo secundum quod dicitur esse a *materia*; alio modo secundum quod ab *accidentibus*; tertio modo secundum quod a *forma signata* et singulari ». Deinde probat, quod nullo istorum modorum esse possit singulare in Deo, et concludit: « Cum igitur Deitas nullo modo plurificetur in Patre et Filio et Spiritus sancto, non se habet Deitas ad Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum ut universale ad singulare ». Bene autem monet Dionyus. Carth. (loc. cit.), illa verba *esse de multis* sensum habere, esse *partem* sive *aliquid* eorum, quae sunt multa vel in multis. Hoc patet ex tota Alexandri argumentatione. Ipse non negat divinam essentiam praedicari de tribus personis analogo modo, sicut omne universale, quod est in multis, praedicatur de multis.

"not of many". What is "not of many" belongs to perfection, because it means the whole 'being'; but "in one alone" belongs to imperfection, because it is more noble to be in many than in one. For that reason the Divine 'Being' is in Many, not in One alone, I say, that It is in many, *not as One multiplied, but as One*. — Likewise one can speak [est loqui] of the particular and individual in three manners: in one manner according to which it is said to be "*from matter*" [a materia]; in another manner according to which (it is said to be) "from *accidents*" [ab accidentibus]; in a third manner according to which (it is said to be) from a "*signed* and singular *form*" [a forma signata et singulari]». Then he proves, that in none of these manners can a singular be in God, and concludes: « Therefore, since the Deity in no manner is plurified in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Deity does not hold itself to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit as a universal to a singular ». Moreover (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian rightly warns (loc. cit.), that those words "*to be of many*" [esse de multis] have the sense, "to be *part* or *something* of those, which are many and/or in many". This is clear from the whole argumentation of Alexander (of Hales). He himself does not deny that the Divine Essence is predicated of the Three Persons in an analogous manner, just as every universal, which is in many, is predicated of many [de multis].

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[1] Vat. praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 hic *ad* pro *in* et mox *vel* loco *nec*.
[2] Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 *mulitiplicatum*.
[3] Plurimi mss. cum ed. 1 exhibent verbum *fit* loco *sic* et particulam *in*, quam Vat. omittit. Mox Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 male substituit *sicut* pro *sic*, post quam particulam plures codd. ut G H K T etc. adiiciunt *est*.
[4] Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *sit*.
[5] Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11: Quocirca ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est. Cfr. etiam supra d. 6. dub. 2. et infra d. XXXIII lit. Magistri circa finem, ubi August. Serm. 1. in Psalm. 68. n. 5 affertur.
[6] Plura de hoc vide infra d. 33.q. 2. et dub. 4. — Mox post primum *aut* in Vat. et cod. cc additur *tunc*, quod deest in aliis mss. et ed. 1.
[7] Ad pleniorem praedictorum intelligentiam vide ea quae S. Doctor supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad. 1. dicit. Cfr. etiam infra d. 26. q. 1. ad 2.et d. 34. a. 2. ad 7. —

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[1] The Vatican edition, not trusting in nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, puts here *to* [ad] for *into* [in] and next *and/or* [vel] in place of *nor* [nec].
[2] The Vatican edition, without the authority of the codices and edition 1, reads *(to be) multiplied* [multiplicatum] for *to be multiplied* [multiplicari].
[3] Very many manuscripts, together with edition 1, exhibit the verb *it comes to be* [fit] in place of *thus* [sic] and of *in* [in], which the Vatican edition omits. Next the Vatican edition, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, badly substitutes *just as* [sicut] for *so* [sic], after which very many codices, such as G H K T etc., add *is it* [est].
[4] Trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *is* [est].
[5] On the Trinity, Bk. VII, ch. 6, n. 11: On which account, as the Substance of the Father is the Father Himself, not by which He is the Father, but by which He is. Cf. also above d. 6, dubium 2, and below in the text of Master (Peter) Dist. XXXIII, near the end, where there is quoted (St.) Augustine's, First Sermon

Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. incongrue *haberi essentiam ab alio et non haberi* loco *habere essentiam ab alio et non habere* et mox *nullus* pro *nulla res*. Cod. T *esse autem ab alio et non esse ab alio* loco *habere autem ab alio et habere non ab alio*, in qua propositione multi codd. cum ed. 1 minus bene *et non habere ab alio*. Dein aliqui codd. *sed ab alio* pro *et ab alio*.

on Psalm 68, n. 5.
[6] For more on this see below d. 33, q. 2, and dubium 4. — Next after *either* [aut], in the Vatican edition and codex cc, there is added *then* [tunc], which is lacking in the other manuscripts and edition 1. [Trans. note: Here the supplying of *being regarded* is according to the reading of the Quaracchi Editors in the d. 26, a. sole, q. 2, Scholium II, 2.]
[7] For a fuller understanding of the aforesaid, see also that which the Seraphic Doctor says above in d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 1. Cf. Also below d. 26, q. 1, in reply to n. 2, and d. 34, a. 2, in reply to n. 7. — The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions, incongruously has *that . . . be had* [haberi] in place of *to have* [habere] in the preceding first pair of clauses, and then *no one* [nullus] for *no thing* [nulla res]. Codex T has *to be* [esse] in place of *to have* [habere] in the previous second pair of clauses, in which many codices together with edition 1, have less well *and to not have from another* [et non habere ab alio]. Then some codices read *but from another* [sed ab alio] for *and from another* [et ab alio] at the end of the argument.

III. Fundamentum solutionis ad 4. est distinctio inter *essentiam* et *proprietatem*, de quo cfr. supra d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion; d. 8. p. II. q. 2; d. 33. q. 2, et praecipue d. 26. q. 1. et Scholion. — Quaestio de principio individuationis in fine responsionis tangitur, de qua II. Sent. d. 3. plura dicenda erunt.

III. The fundament of the solution to n. 4 is the distinction between *essence* and *property*, concerning which, cf. above d. 13, q. 3 and its Scholium; d. 8, p. II, q. 2; d. 33, q. 2, and chiefly d. 26, q. 1 and its Scholium: — The question on the principle of individuation is touched upon at the end of the argument, concerning which in Sent., Bk II, d. 3, more will be said.

IV. De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2; S. I. q. 3. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. 15; S. p. I. q. 47. m. 3. partic. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 3 a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 43. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

IV. On the question itself: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 4, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 3, a. 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 14 and 15; Summa., p. I, a. 47, m. 3, subpart 4. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 43, q. 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.
PARS II.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX
PART II

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

ARTICLE SOLE

Quaestio III.

Question 3

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 360-362.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 360-362.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum in divinis personis poni possit principium materiale.

TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere principium materiale. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Quandocumque aliquis vel aliquid est de aliquo, ita quod ipsum est distinctum, et illud, de quo est, indistinctum, est de illo tanquam de materiali principio;[1] sed persona Filii est de substantia Patris, et persona distinguitur, substantia dicit quid indistinctum: ergo est sicut materiale principium.

2. Item, sicut efficiens et finis sunt causae correlativae, ita forma et materia[2] — forma enim dicitur respectu materiae — sed in Deo est ponere causam formalem, « ipse enim est forma », ut dicit Boethius:[3] ergo in Deo est ponere materiam.

3. Item, videtur quod causa materialis magis competat Deo quam aliquod genus causarum, quia materia in his inferioribus

QUESTION 3

Whether among the Divine Persons there can be posited a material principle.

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether among the Divine Persons there can be posited a material principle. And that (it is) so, is shown in this manner:

1. Whensoever anyone and/or anything is from [de] something, such that it itself is distinct, and that, from which it is, indistinct, it is from that as from a material principle;[1] but the Person of the Son is from the Substance of the Father, and as is distinguished as a person, (and) the Substance means something indistinct: therefore It is as a material principle.

2. Likewise, just as the efficient (cause) and the end are correlative causes, so form and matter[2] — for form is said in respect to matter — but in God there is a positing of a formal cause, « for He Himself is a form », as (St. Severinus) Boethius says:[3] therefore in God there is a positing of matter.

3. Likewise, it seems that a material cause suits [competat] God more than any genus of cause [causarum], because matter

dat existentiam et permanentiam propter sui incorruptionem, unde fundamentum est existentiae creatae:[4] si ergo Deus sive divinum esse habet existentiam sive permanentiam per fundamentum incorruptibile, videtur quod Deo maxime competat ratio materialis principii, ergo etc.

among these inferiors gives existence and permanence on account of its own incorruption, whence is the foundation of created existence:[4] if, therefore, God or the Divine 'Being' has existence or permanent through an incorruptible foundation, it seems that the reckoning of a material principle suits God most of all; ergo etc..

4. Item, in rebus creatis finitas a forma venit, sed infinitas a materia;[5] sed omne quod est in Deo, est infinitum: ergo cum Deo maxime conveniat passio consequens principium materiale, maxime competit et ipsum.

4. Likewise, among created things finity come from form, but infinity from matter;[5] but everything which is in God, is infinite: therefore since the passion consequent to the material principle befits God most of all, the latter (of these two) also suits (Him) most of all.

5. Item, quamvis in Deo sit summa et omnimoda simplicitas, tamen non ponimus in Deo *quod est* et *quo est* vere, sed tamen[6] per indifferentiam: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod in Deo possit poni materia et forma, tamen per indifferentiam.

5. Likewise, although in God there is a most high and omnimodal simplicity, yet we do not truly posit in God (a distinction between) "*what He is*" and "*by which He is*", but (rather), however,[6] (a distinction) through indifference: therefore for an equal reason it seems, that in God there can be posited matter and form, yet through indifference.

6. Item, omnis distinctio est a forma,[7] ergo circumscripta omni forma creata, materia non distinguitur, ergo non est aliud a Deo, ergo est Deus, quia omne quod est et non distinguitur a Deo, est Deus: videtur ergo, quod materiale principium sit ipse Deus, et ita competere divinis personis.[8]

6. Likewise, every distinction is by a form, therefore having excluded every created form, matter is not distinguished, therefore is not other than God, therefore is God, because everything which is and is not distinguished from [a] God, is God: it seems, therefore, that the material principle is God Himself, and thus that it suits the Divine Persons.[8]

Contra: 1. Boethius in libro de Trinitate:[9] « Forma sine materia non potest esse subiectum », et loquitur de Deo: ergo in Deo non erit ratio principii materialis.

On the contrary: 1. (St. Severinus) Boethius in the book On the Trinity (says):[9] « Form without matter cannot be a subject », and he is speaking of God: therefore in God there will not be the reckoning of a material principle.

2. Item, materia inter omnia entia est imperfectissimum, unde et Augustinus dicit in libro Confessionum,[10] quod prope nihil est; sed Deus est omnino perfectissimus. ergo omnino in eo nihil invenitur imperfectionis: ergo nec quod est materiae.

2. Likewise, matter among all beings is the most imperfect, whence even (St.) Augustine says in the book of Confessions,[10] that it is nearly nothing; but God is entirely most perfect: therefore there is found in Him entirely nothing of imperfection: therefore neither what belongs to matter.

3. Item, materia est principium patiendi,[11] unde pati est a materia. Omne igitur, in quo est materia, est natum pati et recipere; sed nihil tale est omnipotens; in hoc enim, quod pati potest, deficit a posse: ergo in omnipotente nullo modo est materiale principium.

3. Likewise, matter is a principle of suffering,[11] whence "to suffer" is from matter. Everything, therefore, in which there is matter, is born to suffer and to receive; but nothing such is omnipotent; for in this, that it can suffer, it fails from being potent [a posse]: therefore in the

4. Item, si materia est in Deo, aut respectu . . .

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[1] Haec propositio fundatur in Aristotelis sententia de materia et forma, quae se habent ad invicem ut potentia (indistinctum) et actus (distinctum), et secundum quam forma substantialis rerum genitarum (excepta anima rationali) educitur e potentia materiae.
[2] Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28-31. (c. 3) et V. Metaph. text. 2. et 3. (IV. c. 2.), ubi hoc colligi potest tum ex definitione causarum, tum ex eo, quod efficiens et finis etc. ponuntur esse sibi invicem causa. Vide S. Thomae et Scoti commentaria in hos locos. — Ex plurimis mss. substituimus *correlativae* loco *corollariae*, pro quo ed. 1 *corrolate*.
[3] Libr. de Trin. c. 2.
[4] Videsis Aristot., I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.), ubi incorruptibilitas materiae monstratur, et VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3), ubi materia tanquam ultimum sive fundamentum substantiae exhibetur. — Ope plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *creatae* loco *creaturae*. Mox Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice ponit *cum* loco *si* et *Deum* pro *divinum* ac *habeat* loco *habet*.
[5] Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 59-72. (c. 6. et 7.) et Averroes, in comment. supr praedictos textus. — Paulo infra post *passio* fide fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 expunximus repetitum *maxime*, quod codd. C O hoc loco ponunt, ipso tamen omisso post *Deo*. Dein cod. Z post *competit* addit *ei*.
[6] Vat., refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *tantum*. Mox plures codd. cum Vat. *posset* loco *possit*.
[7] Aristot., VII. Metaphys. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.): Actus namque separat (□ □□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□). — De indistinctione materiae vide q. praec. in corp.
[8] In Vat. desiderantur verba *et ita competere divinis personis*, quae tamen exstant in omnibus mss. et sex primis edd.
[9] Cap. 2. Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum.
[10] Libr. XII. c. 7. n. 7: Tu eras et aliud nihil, unde fecisti caelum et terram, duo quaedam; unum prope te, alterum prope nihil. — Ex multis mss. ut A F G K T Y Z etc. et sex prmis edd. post *unde* supplevimus *et*, ac paulo infra fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *perfectissimus* loco *perfectissimum*. In fine argumenti cod. A *materia* pro *materiae*.
[11] Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 55. (c. 7.): Materia, ut materia, passiva est. Et ibid. II. text. 53. (c. 9.): Materia enim est pati. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *Unde omne* loco *Omne igitur*.

Omnipotent there is in no manner a material principle.

4. Likewise, if there is matter in God, either (it is) in respect to . . .

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[1] This proposition is founded on the sentence of Aristotle concerning matter and form, which hold themselves to one another as potency (indistinct) and act (distinct), and according to which the substantial form of things begotten (except the rational soul) is drawn forth out of the potency of matter.
[2] Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, texts 23-31 (ch. 3) and Metaphysics, Bk. V, texts 2 and 3 (Bk. IV, ch. 2), where this can be gathered both from the definition of causes, and from this, that the efficient (cause) and the end etc. are posited to be the cause of one another. See the Commentaries of St. Thomas and (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on these passages. — From very many manuscripts we have substituted *correlative* [correlativae] for *corollary* [corollariae], in place of which edition 1 has *in a corollary manner* [corrolate].
[3] On the Trinity, ch. 2.
[4] See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 82, (ch. 9), where the incorruptibility of matter is demonstrated, and Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 8 (Bk. VI, ch. 3), where matter is shown (to be) as the extreme [ultimum] or foundation of substance. — With the help of very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *created* [creatae] in place of *a creature's* [creaturae]. Next the Vatican edition together with only one or the other codex, puts *since* [cum] in place of *if* [si], and *God* [Deum] for *Divine* [divinum], and the subjunctive form of *has* [habeat].
[5] Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, texts. 59-72 (chs. 6-7), and Averroes, in his commentary on the aforesaid texts. — A little below this after *passion* [passio], trusting in nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged the repeated *most of all* [maxime], which codices C and O put in this place, having omitted it after *God* [Deo]. Then codex Z after *suits* [competit] ads *Him* [ei].
[6] The Vatican edition, breaking with the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3, reads *only* [tantum]. Next very many codices together with the Vatican edition have *could* [posset] for *can* [possit].
[7] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 49 (Bk. VI., ch. 13): For an act separates (□ □□□ □□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□). — On the indistinction of matter, see the preceding question, in the body (of the response).
[8] In the Vatican edition there is wanting the words *thus that it suits the Divine Persons* [et ita competere divinis personis], which however are extant in all the manuscripts and the six first editions.
[9] Chapter 2: But the form, which is without matter, will not be able to be a subject.
[10] Bk. XII, ch. 7. n. 7: Thou was and nothing else, from which Thou hast made Heaven and Earth, a certain two; one near Thee, the other near nothing. — From many manuscripts, such as A F G K T Y Z etc. and the six first editions, we have supplied *even*

[et] after *whence* [unde], and a little below this, trusting in very many codices and edition 1, we have substituted *most perfect* [perfectissimus] in place of *the most perfect (being)* [perfectissimum]. At the end of the argument codex A has *is matter* [est materia] for *belongs to matter* [est materiae].
[11] Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 53, (ch. 9): For matter is suffering [pati]. — Next the Vatican edition together with codex cc, yet with the other codices and edition 1 striving against this, has *Wherefore, everything* [Unde omne] in place of *Everything, therefore* [Omne igitur].

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p. 361

sui, aut[1] *aliorum*. Si respectu *aliorum*: cum ergo materia sit ens in potentia ad alia nec distinguatur ab aliis rebus, sed per eas perficiatur, tunc Deus reciperet complementum a creatura nec ab ea distingueretur, quod absurdum est. Si autem materia est[2] in Deo respectu *sui*, aut *pure* est materia, aut aliquid *aliud*. Si *pure* materia: ergo non est ens.[3] Et *praeterea*, nihil est materia sui ipsius: ergo oportet, quod ibi sit aliquid cum materia: et si hoc, ergo divinum esse est compositum et mixtum: ergo nec Deus habet *esse simplex* ac per hoc nec *esse primum*, et ita non est Deus.

Himself, or[1] *to others*. If in respect to *others*: therefore, since matter is a being in potency to others, and it is not distinguished by other things, but is perfected through them, then God would receive a complement from [a] creature, and would not be distinguished from it; which is absurd. But, if there is[2] matter in God in respect to Himself, He is either *purely* matter, or something *else*. If *purely* matter: therefore He not a being [ens].[3] And *besides*, nothing is the matter of its very self: therefore, it is necessary [oportet], that something be There with the matter: and if this (is so), therefore the Divine 'Being' [divinum esse] is composite and mixed: therefore God has neither a *simple 'being'* and through this neither a *prime 'being'*, and thus is not God.

CONCLUSIO.

In Deo nullo modo, nec proprie nec transumtive, poni potest materiale principium.

CONCLUSION

In God in no manner, neither properly nor transumptively, can there be posited a material principle.

R**ESPONDEO:** Dicendum, quod in Deo nullo modo, nec proprie, nec transumtive recipitur materiale principium. Et ratio huius est, quoniam materia dicit principium passivum et ita incompletum; et quoniam a divino esse[4] omnis incompletio et omnis passio penitus removenda est, ideo nullo modo genus materialis principii in Deo esse ponitur.

I **RESPOND:** It must be said, that in God in no manner, neither properly, nor transumptively is a material principle received. And the reason for this is, since "matter" means a passive principle and thus an incomplete one; and since from the Divine 'Being'[4] every incompletion and every passion is to be thoroughly removed, for that reason in no manner is the genus of a material principle to be posited in God.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod persona est *de substantia*, et ipsa est *distincta*, et substantia non; dicenum, quod hic est defectus quantum ad utramque conditionem. Nam *primo* haec non recipitur, quod *persona* sit *de substantia*,

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that a Person is *from the Substance*, and It itself is *distinct*, and the Substance not; it must be said, that here there is a defect as much as regards each condition. For *first* this is not received, "that a *Person* is *from the*

sicut vult Augustinus,[5] quia « non dicimus tres personas ex eadem essentia »: licet haec communiter recipiatur, quod *Filius* est de substantia Patris, ubi non materia, sed originis consubstantialitas designatur, sicut supra ostensum est distinctione quinta.[6] *Alia* est conditio, quae deficit: nam materia est distincta[7] et possibilis ad distinctionem per formam; sed substantia vel essentia nullo modo distinguitur nec per se nec per accidens; et ita patet, quod non convenit ei ratio materiae.

Substance", just as (St.) Augustine[5] would have it, because « we do not say that Three Persons (are) out of the same Essence »: though this is commonly received, "that *the Son* is from the Substance of the Father", where not matter, but a consubstantiality of origin is designated, just as has been shown above in the Fifth Distinction.[6] The *other* is the condition, which is deficient: for matter is distinct[7] and able to be distinguished [possibilis ad distinctionem] through form; but the Substance and/or Essence in no manner is distinguished, neither through Itself nor through an accident; and thus it is clear, that the reckoning of matter does not befit Him.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod efficiens refertur ad finem et forma ad materiam; dicendum, quod nullius causae habitudo cadit in Deo[8] respectu sui, sed respectu creaturarum; et aliarum causarum habitudines in Deo recipiuntur, circumscripta dependentia, propter hoc, quod sonant in perfectionem;[9] sed materia sonat omnino in imperfectinoem. Et quod obiicitur, quod forma dicitur ad materiam; dicendum, quod est forma *constitutiva* et *exemplaris*. Et forma *constitutiva* dicitur ad materiam; et haec non cadit in Deo, sed forma *exemplaris* sic.[10] Et si dicatur, quod Deus est forma in se, hoc est dictum, quia est actus purus non dependens a possibili. Nec tamen simile est de correspondentia *formae* et *materiae*, et *efficientis* et *finis*.[11] *Efficiens* enim et *finis* possunt incidere in idem numero; sed *forma* et *materia* nunquam. Forma vero[12] *constitutiva* incidit cum *efficiente* et *fine* in idem species, non numero; forma vero *exemplaris* in idem numero.

2. To that which is objected, that the efficient (cause) is referred to the end and form to matter; it must be said, that the habitude of no cause occurs in God[8] in respect to Himself, but (rather) in respect to creatures; and the habitudes of the other causes are received in God, with dependence excluded, on account of this, that they pertain to [sonant in] perfection;[9] but matter pertains entirely to imperfection. And what is objected, that form is meant for matter [dicitur ad materiam]; it must be said, that "form" is *constitutive* and *exemplary*. And *constitutive* form is meant for matter; and this does not occur in God, but an *exemplary* form does [sic].[10] And if there be said, that God is a form in Himself, this has been said, because He is the Pure Act, not dependent on the possible. Nor yet is it similar concerning the correspondence of *form* and *matter*, *the efficient (cause)* and *the end*.[11] For the *efficient (cause)* and the *end* can fall [incidit] upon the same in number; but *form* and *matter* never. However[12] a *constitutive* form does fall with the *efficient (cause)* and the *end* upon the same species, not in number; but an *exemplary* form (does) upon the same in number.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materia est fundamentum existentiae; dicendum, quod modus illius fundamenti Deo non competit, quia[13] est fundamentum *esse* quod recipit aliunde, scilicet a forma; Deus autem a nullo recipit: ideo non cadit in eo materia.

3. To that which is objected, that mater is the foundation of existence; it must be said, that the manner of that foundation does not suit God, because (matter)[13] is the foundation of the 'being' [esse] which it receives from elsewhere, that is from form; but God receives from no one: for that reason matter does not occur in Him.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinitate,

4. To that which is objected concerning

dicendum, quod est infinitus ex *defectu perfectionis*, et haec competit materiae, sed non Deo; et est infi- / -nitas . . .

infinity, it must be said, that there is an infinite out of a *defect of perfection*, and this suits matter, but not God; and there is an infi- / -nity . . .

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[1] Aliqui cod. ut Y Z cum ed. 1 repetunt hic *respectu*.
[2] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *est* pro *sit*. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G H I S W Z cum ed. 1 *absurdissimum* loco *absurdum*.
[3] Vide a nobis ex Aristotele allatam definitionem materiae q. praec. pag. 358, nota 11. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *divinum esse*, quod exhibetur ab aliis mss., licet plures eorum cum ed. 1 incongrue *Deum* loco *divinum* ponant.
[4] Pauci codd. ut S W *a divinis* loco *a divino esse*. Mox ed. 1 *remota* pro *removenda*.
[5] Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11: Nec sic ergo Trinitatem dicimus tres personas vel substantias, unam essentiam et unum Deum, tanquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant . . . tamen tres personas eiusdem essentiae vel tres pesonas unam essentiam dicimus; tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona. — Paulo infra post *licet* plures codd. ut A T X Y cum ed. 1 omittunt *haec*.
[6] Art. 1. q. 2.
[7] Exhibemus lectionem plurimorum mss., quae cum subnexis magis convenit, dum Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus codd. habet *indistincta*, cui cod. I adiungit *de se*.
[8] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *Deum*.
[9] Mendum Vat. et ed. 1 nec non aliquorum mss. *sonant imperfectionem* ex aliis mss. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 correximus; cod. Y *sonat imperfectionem* scil. dependentia, non false, sed minus ad rem. Mox multi codd. cum Vat. et ed. 1 post *omnino* omittunt *in*, quod tamen in aliis mss. et edd. 2, 3, 6, invenitur.
[10] Ita multi codd. ut A N O R T V W X Y etc. cum ed. 1; Vat. cum aliquibus mss., interpunctione variata, incongrue *exemplaris, sicut si*, codd. A Z omittunt *sic*. Mox, postulatibus mss. et sex primis edd., substituimus *dictum* pro *dictu*. Immediate post legunt plures codd. ut F G H K L O Y ee ff *quod* loco *quia*.
[11] Aliqui codd. ut S W X hic et paulo post *finalis*.
[12] Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 delevimus hic additum *tantum*. — Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.) ait: Veniunt autem tres (causae) in unam plerumque; ipsum enim quid est (causa formalis) et id cuius gratis (causa finalis) una est; ipsum vero unde motus primum (causa efficiens) specie eadem est his; homo enim hominem generat.
[13] Supple: materia. In proxime sequentibus praestamus fere omnium mss.et ed. 1 lectionem, quae et cum sententia S. Doctoris de essentiali dependentia materiae a forma congruit (cfr. II. Sent. d. 12. a. 1. q. 1). Cod. F, transpositis verbis, *quia est funamentum, quod recipit esse aliunde* etc.; Vat. vero cum edd. 4, 5, 6 *quia esse fundamentum est esse quod recipit aliud, et aliunde perficitur, scilicet a forma*; tandem cod. cc cum edd. 2, 3, quoad primam propositionis partem cum Vat., quoad secundam partem, omissis scil. *aliud et* ac *perficitur*, cum aliis mss. consentit. — Paulo ante cod. Y *in Deo non*

[1] Some codices, such as Y and Z, together with edition 1 repeat here *in respect* [respectu].
[2] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *there is* [est] for *there be* [sit]. A little before this very many codices, such as A G H I S W Z, together with edition 1, read *most absurd* [absurdissimum] in place of *absurd* [absurdum].
[3] See the defintion of “matter” cited by us from Aristotle, in the preceding questions, p. 358, footnote 11. — Next the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, has *it is* [est] for *the Divine ‘Being’ is* [divinum esse], which is exhibited by the other manuscripts, though very many of them together with edition 1 incongruously read *God* [Deum] for *the divine* [divinum].
[4] Few codices, such as S and W, have *from the divine* [a divinis] in place of *from the Divine ‘Being’* [a divino esse]. Next edition 1 has *has been* [remota] for *is to be* [removenda].
[5] On the Trinity, Bk. VII, ch. 6, n. 11: Therefore, neither do we in this manner say that the Trinity (is) Three Persons and/or Substances, the one Essence and the One God, as if out of one matter a certain Three subsist . . ., however, we do say that the Three Persons (are) of the same Essence and/or that the Three Persons (are) the One Essence; but we do not say that the Three Persons (are) out of the same Essence, as if There one thing is what the Essence is, another what a Person (is). — A little below this after *though* [licet] very many codices, such as A T X and Y, together with edition 1, omit *this (proposition)* [haec].
[6] Article 1, q. 2.
[7] We exhibit the reading of very many manuscripts, which agrees more with the subjoined, while the Vatican edition, together with edition 1 and some codices, has *indistinct* [indistincta], to which codex I adds *from itself* [de se].
[8] The Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and to edition 1, reads *falls upon God* [cadit in Deum] for *occurs in God* [cadit in Deo].
[9] The error of the Vatican edition and edition 1, and also of some manuscripts, of reading *resound imperfection* [sonant imperfectionem] for *pertain to perfection* [sonant in perfectionem], we have corrected from the other manuscripts and editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6; codex Y has *it resounds imperfection* [sonant imperfectionem], that is *the dependence* [dependentia], not falsely, but less to the point. Next many codices together with the Vatican edition and edition 1, read *resound entirely imperfection* [sonat omnino imperfectionem], which is corrected from the other manuscripts and editions 2, 3 and 6.
[10] Thus many codices, such as A N O R T V W X Y etc., together with edition 1; the Vatican edition, together with some manuscripts, with a varied punctuation, incongruously reads *just as if* [sicut si] for *does. And if* [sic. Et si], codices A and Z omits *does* [sic]. Immediately after this very many

reperitur pro *Deo non competit*.

codices, such as F G H K L O Y ee and ff, have *that* [quod] for *because* [quia].

[11] Some codices, such as S W and X, here and a little after this read *the final (cause*) [finalis].

[12] Trusting in very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have deleted here the added *only* [tantum]. — Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 70, (ch. 7) says: But for the most part the three (causes) come upon one; for 'that which it is' (the formal cause) and 'that for the sake of which it is' (the final cause) are one; however 'that whence the first movement is' (the efficient cause) is according to the same species as these; for a man generates a man.

[13] Supply: matter. In the words that follow next we offer the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, which is also congruent with the sentence of the Seraphic Doctor concerning the essential dependence of matter from form (cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1). Codex F, with transposed words, reads *because it is the foundation, which receives 'being' from elsewhere* etc. [quia est fundamentum, quod recipit esse aliunde etc]; but the Vatican edition, together with editions 4, 5, and 6 has *because "to be a foundation" is "to be what receives the other", and is perfected from elsewhere, that is by form* [quia esse fundamentum est esse quod recipit aliud, et aliunde perficitur, scilicet a forma]; next codex cc, together with editions 2 and 3, together with the Vatican edition which reads *to be that which it receives from elsewhere* etc. [esse quod recipit aliunde], agrees with the other manuscripts. — A little before this codex Y has *is not found in God* [in Deo non reperitur] for *does not suit God* [Deo non competit].

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p. 362

infi- / -nitas ex *privatione limitationis*, et haec Deo et formae liberrime, non materiae competit; et ita patet illud.

infi- / -nity out of a *privation of limitation*, and this suits God and form most freely [liberrime], not matter; and thus that is clear.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quare materia et forma non ponuntur per indifferentiam; dicendum, quod ista duo, *quo est* et *quod est*, de ratione sua nullam important imperfectionem, sed ratione eius quod differunt. Unde, sublata eorum differentia, manet completio, et tunc[1] in divinis recipiuntur. Sed materia, non tantum quia differt a forma, dicit incompletionem, sed etiam quia materia est; et ideo nullo modo ponitur in Deo.

5. To that which is objected, for what reason is matter and form not posited through indifference; it must be said, that those two, "*that whereby it is*" and "*that which it is*", from their own reckoning convey no imperfection, but (they do) by reason of this, that they differ. Whence, with their difference withdrawn [sublata], there remains completion, and then[1] they are received among the divine. But matter, not only because it differs from form, means incompletion, but also because it is matter; and for that reason in no manner is it posited in God.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod circumscripta omni forma, materia non distinguitur; dicendum, quod ista propositio: omnis distinctio est a forma, non

6. To that which is objected last, that with every form excluded, matter is not distinguished; it must be said, that that proposition: 'every distinction is by a form

habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur de distinctione perfecta — quod enim habet esse distinctum habet esse completum — de[2] distinctione autem qualicumque falsum est. Materia enim differt a forma, et constat quod se ipsa differt[3] ab ea. Sic potest dici et in proposito, quod materia differt a Deo se ipsa; tamen ex parte sua, quia non est perfecta, non cadit perfecta distinctio; sed ex parte Dei, quia perfectissimus est, perfecta cadit distinctio. Causa[4] enim distinguitur a causato, ens actu ab ente in potentia; et istae sunt primae differentiae et summae.

[a forma]', does not have truth, unless it be understood of a perfect distinction — for what has a distinct 'being' has a complete 'being' — but of[2] any kind of distinction whatsoever it is false. For matter differs from form [a forma], and it is established that it differs[3] by its very self from it. In this manner it can be said even in the proposed, that matter differs from God by its very self; however on its own part, because it is not perfect, a perfect distinction does not occur; but on the part of God, because He is most perfect, there does occur a perfect distinction. For cause[4] is distinguished by cause, a being in act from a being in potency; and these are the first and most high differences.

SCHOLION.

I. Quaestio haec militat contra pantheismum seu potius materialismum, a Concilio Vaticano (cont. I. *de Deo creatore*, can. 2.) his verbis notatum: Si quis prater materiam nihil esse affirmare non erubuerit; a. s. In species eadem confundit insaniam Davidis de Dinanto, cuius principale argumentum fuit illud quod ultimo loco inter ad opos. legitur, scil. hoc: si Deus non esset idem quod prima materia, oporteret differre ea aliquibus differentiis, et sic non essent simplicia. Nam in eo quod per differentiam ab alio differt, ipsa differentia compositionem facit. Ita S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. I. c. 17.) hoc Davidis argumentum refert, et deinde ad mentem S. Bonav. sic solvit: « Hoc autem processit ex ignorantia, qua nescivit, quid inter differentiam et diversitatem intersit. Differens enim, ut in decimo Metaphysicorum (text. comm. 12.) determinatur, dicitur ad aliquid; absolute dicitur ex hoc, quod non est idem. Differentia igitur in his quaerenda est, quae in aliquo conveniunt; oportet enim aliquid in his assignari, secundum quod differant, sicut duae species conveniutn in genere, unde oportet, quod differentiis distinguantur. In his autem, quae in nullo conveniunt, non est quaerendum, quo differant; sed se ipsis diversa sunt. Sic enim et oppositae differentiae ab invicem distinguuntur; non enim participant genus quasi partem suae essentiae; et ideo non est quaerendam, quibus differant; se ipsis enim diversa sunt. Sic etiam Deus et materia prima distinguuntur, quorum unum

SCHOLIUM

I. This question militates against pantheism or rather materialism, condemned by the Vatican Council (First Constitution "*On God the Creator*", canon 2) with these words: If anyone is not ashamed to affirm that there is nothing besides matter, anathema sit. In view of which it refutes the insanity of David of Dinan, whose principal argument was that which is read in the last place among the (arguments) opposed [i.e. the first arg. n. 6], that is this: 'if God was not the same as prime matter, it would be necessary [oportet] that they differ by some differences, and in this manner they would not be simple. For in this, that it differs from Him through a difference, that difference causes a composition. Thus (St.) Thomas (<u>Summa contra Gentiles</u>, Bk. I, ch. 17) reports the argument of David, and then solves it thus according to the mind of St. Bonaventure: « But this proceeded out of ignorance, by which he did not know, what lies [intersit] between a difference and diversity. For "different", as is determined in the tenth (book) of the <u>Metaphysics</u> (text of the commentary n. 12), is said according to something; it is said in an absolute manner from this, that it is not the same. Therefore a difference is to be sought in these, which convene in something; for it is necessary [oportet] that something be assigned among them, according to which they differ, just as two species convene in a genus, whence it is necessary [oportet], that they be distinguished by differences. But among those, which convene in nothing,

est actus purus, aliud potentia pura, in nullo convenitentiam habentes ». Idem argumentum Davidis B. Albert. simili modo solvit. (S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 2. q. incid.). — In eadem solut. ad 6. a S. Bonav. duplex ponitur species distinctionis, scil. altera perfecta et specifica per formam, altera imperfecta per propriam entitatem materiae.

II. Praeter citatos cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 4. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 3. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 20. a. 1, ubi refert et solvit plura argumenta « Alexandri, cuiusdam Graeci, et David de Dinanto, Latini »; et S. p. I. tr. 11. q. 47. m. 3. partic. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 28. q. 2, et a. 29. q. 2. — Ceteri doctores hanc quaest. tangunt tractando de simplicitate Dei, in specie de illo problemate, utrum Deus sit in aliquod genere determinato, de quo agit Magister d. 8. p. II.

[1] Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 substituimus *tunc* loco *ideo*.
[2] In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *de*, quod invenitur in aliis mss. et ed. 1. Paulo supra codd. L O post *distinctione* addunt *positiva*.
[3] Vat., obnitentibus codd. et ed. 1, *distat*.
[4] Consensu mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 posuimus *causa* loco *incausatum*.

one is not to seek, whereby they differ; but (rather) they are diverse by their very selves. For in the same manner even opposed differences are distinguished from one another; for they do not share a genus as a part of their essence; and for that reason one is not to seek, whereby they differ; for they are diverse by their very selves. In this manner even God and prime matter are distinguished, One of which is a pure act, the other pure potency, (both) having a convening [convenientiam] in nothing ». The same argument of David Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) solves in a similar manner (Summa., p. I, tr. 4. q. 20. m. 2, incidental question). — In the same solution to n. 6 by St. Bonaventure, there is posited a twofold species of distinction, namely, the one perfect and specific through form, the other imperfect through the entity belonging to matter.

II. Besides the authors cited, cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 4. — St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 3, a. 1 and 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 20, a. 1, where he cites and solves many the arguments « of Alexander, a certain Greek, and of David of Dinan, the Latin »; and Summa., p. I, tr. 11, q. 47, m. 3, subpart 5. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 3 and 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 28, q. 2, and a. 29, q. 2. — All the other doctors touch upon this question when treading of the simplicity of God, especially concerning that problem, whethere God is in any determinate genus, with which Master (Peter) deals in d. 8, p. II.

[1] From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, we have substituted *then* [tunc] in place of *for that reason* [ideo].
[2] In the Vatican edition and codex cc, there is wanting *of* [de], which is found in the other manuscripts and in edition 1. A little above this codices L and O, read *a perfect, positive distinction* [distinctione positiva perfecta].
[3] The Vatican edition, with the codices and edition 1 striving against this, reads *is distant* [distat].
[4] With the consent of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, we have put *cause* [causa] for *the uncaused* [incausatum].

the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

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S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

PARS II.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio IV.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 362-365.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX

PART II

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 4

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 362-365.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO IV.

Utrum in divinis personis differentia secundum numerum possit poni.

QUARTO ET ULTIMO quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere differentiam secundum numerum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Damascenus in tertio libro:[5] « Numero, non natura differunt hypostases »; et loquitur de divinis hypostasibus.

2. Item, omnia quae contingit vere numerari, necesse est differre numero; sed hypostases vere contingit numerari, ut dicantur duae et tres: ergo vere cadit in eis differentia secundum numerum.

3. Item, omnia quae differunt re, aut differunt genere, aut specie, aut numero,

QUESTION 4

Whether among the Divine Persons a difference according to number can be posited.

FOURTH AND LASTS there is asked, whether among the divine there is a positing of difference according to number. And it seems that (it is) so:

1. (St. John) Damascene in the third book (On the Orthodox Faith): « By number, not nature do the Hypostases differ »; and he is speaking of the Divine Hypostases.

2. Likewise, it is necessary that all which happened to be truly numbered, differ in number; but the Hypostases happen to be truly numbered, as They are said (to be) Two and Three: therefore there truly occurs among Them a difference according to number.

3. Likewise, all which differ in thing [re], either differ in genus, or in species, or in

aut nullo modo differunt.[6] Sed impium est dicere, quod hypostases nullo modo differant: ergo saltem numero differunt.

number, or differ in no manner.[6] But it is impious to say, that the Hypostases differ in no manner: therefore They at least differ in number.

4. Item, unitas secundum[7] numerum non respicit unitatem formae, sed suppositi — quod patet: hoc enim albus et hic sedens, demonstrato Petro, est unum numero — ergo ab oppositis diversitas secundum numerum non respicit diversitatem natuae, sed suppositorum; sed in Deo est pluralitas suppositorum, quamvis non sit diversitas naturarum: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, unity according to[7] number does not look back to unity of form, but (to that) of the supposit — which is clear: for this white one and this one seated, having been demonstrated (to be) Peter, is one in number — therefore from opposites [ab oppositis] diversity according to number does not look back to diversity of nature, but (to that) of supposits; but in God there is a plurality of Supposits, though there is not a diversity of Nature: ergo etc..

[5] De Fide orthod. c. 6: Personae siquidem non natura, sed numero inter se distingui dicuntur.
[6] Cfr. Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.): V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 9.); et Boeth., de Trin. c. 1.
[7] In Vat. et cod. cc praeter fidem ceterorum mss. et ed. 1 adiungitur *materiam sive*, et paulo infra contra plurimos codd. ponitur *et hoc patet* loco *quod patet*, pro quo cod. Z *hoc enim patet*.

[5] On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 6: If indeed the Persons not in nature, but in number are said to be distinguished among Themselves.
[6] Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 6 (ch. 5): Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 16 (Bk. IV, ch. 9); and (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 1.
[7] In the Vatican edition and codex cc, not trusting in all the other manuscripts and edition 1, there is added *matter or* [material sive], and a little below this, contrary to very many codices, there is put *and this is clear* [et hoc patet] in place of *which is clear* [quod patet], in place of which codex Z has *for this is clear* [hoc enim patet].

p. 363

5. Item, idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt ens:[1] ergo omne quod est ad alterum comparatum, aut est idem specie, aut diversum; aut idem numero, aut diversum. Ergo Pater, comparatus Filio,[2] aut est *idem* numero, aut *diversus*. Si *idem*; sed quandocumque aliqua duo sunt eadem numero, unum vere praedicatur de altero: ergo possum dicere: Pater est Filius, quod est[3] contra fidem. Si *diversus* numero: ergo in divinis cadit diversitas secundum numerum.

5. Likewise, "same" and "diverse" sufficiently divide being [ens]:[1] therefore everything which is compared to the other, either is the same in species, or diverse; or the same in number, or diverse. Therefore the Father, compared to the Son,[2] either is *the same* in number, or *diverse*. If *the same*, but whensoever any two are the same in number, one is truly predicated of the other: therefore I can say: 'the Father is the Son', which is[3] contrary to the Faith. If *diverse* in number: therefore among the divine there does occur diversity according to number.

Sed contra: 1. Ambrosius super secundam Epistolam ad Corinthios, et Magister recitat in littera:[4] « Ibi vere unitas, ubi *nulla* diversitas »: ergo non est ibi diversitas secundum naturam, cum sit *aliqua* diversitas, scilicet diversitas secundum numerum.

But on the contrary: 1. (St.) Ambrose on the Second Letter to the Corinthians (says), and (as) Master (Peter) recites in the text:[4] « There truly (is) unity, where (there is) *no* diversity »: therefore there is no diversity according to nature, though there is *some* diversity, namely, a diversity according to number.

2. Item, Boethius in libro de Trinitate capitulo secundo. « Nulla est in Deo

2. Likewise, (St. Severinus) Boethius in the book On the Trinity, second chapter (says):

diversitas, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo »: ergo nec differentia[5] secundum numerum.

« There is in God no diversity, no plurality out of a diversity, no multitude out of accidents »: therefore neither a difference[5] according to number.

3. Item, diversitas secundum numerum solum venit ex parte materiae; unde dicit Philosophus,[6] quod « omnino materia numerabiliter est »; sed in divinis non cadit materia aliqua: ergo nec diversitas secundum numerum.

3. Likewise, diversity according to number alone comes on the part of matter; whence the Philosopher says, that « matter is entirely in a numerable manner [numerabiliter] »; but not matter occurs among the divine: therefore neither a diversity according to number.

4. Item, quaecumque differunt numero, numerant[7] omnia quae sunt in se ipsis, saltem omnia quae sunt ibi ex parte formalis principii. Hoc patet, quia enim Petrus et Paulus sunt duo, ideo duo homines, duo animalia, duo alba, et sic de singulis: ergo si Pater et Filius[8] sunt numero differentes, ergo habent duas naturas, et duas essentias: ergo sunt duo dii, quod est contra catholicam fidem.

4. Likewise, whatsoever differ in number, number[7] (by that number) all which are in them, at least all which are there on the part of the formal principle. This is clear, for because Peter and Paul are two, for that reason (they are) two men, two animals, two whites, and thus concerning each: therefore if the Father and the Son are[8] different in number, therefore they have two natures, and two essences: therefore they are two gods; which is contrary to the Catholic Faith.

5. Item, quaecumque differunt numbero, sunt separabilia imaginatione vel intellectu; sed Pater et Filius nullo modo sunt separabiles, nec re[9] nec intellectu, in divinis, quia una persona est in alia et e converso: ergo nec differunt numero.

5. Likewise, whatsoever differ in number, are separable in the imagination and/or intellect; but the Father and the Son are in no manner separable, neither in thing[9] nor in intellect, among the divine, because one Persons is in the Other and vice versa [e converso]: therefore neither do They differ in number.

6. Item, quod non est multiplicabile nec multiplicatum est unum numero; sed divina natura non est multiplicabilis nec multiplicata: ergo est unum numero;[10] sed quaecumque sunt unum numero, non possunt differre numero: ergo si essentia vel natura divina ceteras complectitur personas, impossibile est, quod personae numero differant.

6. Likewise, what is not multipliable nor multiplied is one in number; but the Divine Nature is not multipliable nor multiplied: therefore It is one in number;[10] but whatsoever are one in number, cannot differ in number: therefore if the Divine Essence and/or Nature comprises all the other Persons, it is impossible, that the Persons differ in number.

CONCLUSIO.

In divinis non est ponenda differentia secundum numerum, licet personae numerentur.

CONCLUSION

Among the divine there is not to be posited a difference according to number, though the Persons are numbered.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in divinis non est ponere differentiam secundum numerum. Et huius ratio sumi potest et *a posteriori* et *a priori*.

I respond: It must be said, that among the divine there is no positing of a difference according to number. And the reason for this can be taken both *a posteriori* and *a priori*.

A posteriori: quoniam omnia quae differunt numero, consequitur ista passio, quae est numerus; numerus autem est aggregatio

A posteriori : since to all which differ in number, there is consequent this passion, which is “number”, but “number” is the

multitudinis, in qua plus est in toto quam in singulis partium.[11] Haec autem aggregatio est ex his solum, quae habent unitatem limitatem, quae plus est cum alio quam per se ipsam. Limitatio autem venit per additionem. Additio autem perducit ad compositionem cum materia, quae facit esse *hic et nunc*, et *tantum* et non plus; et ita non est diversitas secundum numerum nisi in his, in quibus est distinctio per additionem et compositionem et materiam. Et[12] haec distinctio non cadit in Deo, ideo nec diversitas secundum numerum.

aggregation of a multitude, in which there is more in the whole than in each of the parts.[11] But this aggregation is only out of those, which have a limited unity, which is more with the other than through itself. But limitation comes through addition. But addition leads thoroughly to composition with matter, which causes it to be "*here and now*" and "*so much* and not more"; and thus there is not a diversity according to number except among those, in which there is a distinction through addition and composition and matter. And[12] this distinction does not occur in God, for that reason neither (does) a diversity according to number.

Alia ratio est *a priori*: quia in quolibet, quod intelligimus ut completum, intelligimus sub ista duplici conditione, scilicet per modum *quo est* et *quod est*; et unitas quidem sive identitas secundum *speciem* vel genus venit[13] a parte eius quod est *quo*, secundum diversos status sive completionem maiorem et minorem. Unitas vero, vel diversitas secundum *numerum* venit a parte ipsius *quod est* secundum esse, sive prout est in supposito[14] individuo. Sic autem ista duo coniuncta sunt in omnibus, quod numerato ipso *quod est*, necesse est, numerari ipsum *quo est*. Cum ergo in omnibus, quae differunt numero, numeretur ipsum *quod est*, necesse est, quod multiplicetur in illis ipsum *quo est*.

The other reason is *a priori*: because in anything [quolibet], which we understand as complete, we understand under this twofold condition, namely, through the standard of measure "*by which it is*" and *"which it is*"; and indeed unity or identity according to *species* and/or genus comes[13] on the part of that which "*by which* it is", according to diverse states or a greater and lesser completion. However, unity and/or diversity according to *number* comes on the part of that "*which it is*" according to a 'to be' [esse], or insofar as it is in an individual[14] supposit. But in this manner those two have been conjoined in all, which differ in number, because having numbered that "*which it is*", it is necessary, that there be numbered that "*by which it is*". Therefore, since in all, which differ in number, there is numbered that "*which it is*", it is necessary, that there be multiplied in them that "*by which it is*".

Et quia ad diversitatem secundum numerum concurrit diversitas ipsius *quo est* et *quod est* et *qui* . . .

And because to diversity according to number there concurs diversity of that "*by which it is*" and "*which it is*" and "*who* . . .

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[1] Vide supra pag. 104 nota 5.
[2] Praeferimus lectionem maioris partis codd. ut A F G H I S T U W Y Z etc. et ed. 1 lectioni aliquorum codd. et Vat. *Si ergo Pater comparatur Filio*. Mox post *Si idem* ex plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supplevimus male omissum *sed*.
[3] Cod. H addit *falsum et*.
[4] Hic, c. 4. circa finem. — Paulo infra lectionem fere omnium mss.et ed. 1 restituimus addendo *cum sit aliqua diversitas, scil. diversitas secundum numerum*. [Trans. nota: Hic lectio textus originalis *secundum numerum* loco *secundum naturam*, videtur mendum, quoniam processus argumentum requirit contradistinctionem inter *secundum naturam*

[1] See above d. 4, dubium 2, p. 104, footnote 5.
[2] We prefer the reading of the greater part of the codices, such as A F G H I S T U W Y Z etc., and edition 1, to the reading of the other codices and the Vatican edition, *If, therefore, the Father is compared to the Son* [Si ergo Pater comparatur Filio]. Next after *If the same* [Si idem], we have supplied from many manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6, the badly omitted *but* [sed].
[3] Codex H adds *false and* [falsum et].
[4] Here in ch. 4, near the end. — A little below this, we have restored the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, by adding *though there is some diversity, namely, a diversity according to*

clausulae primae et *secundum numerum* clausulae secunda; et haec mutatio magis correspondet ad mutationem in ista nota facta a editoribus Quaracchiensibus, et etiam ad logicam auctoritatis Ambrosii]

[5] Cod. V *diversitas*.

[6] Libr. I. Phys. text. 66. (c. 7.).

[7] Plurimi mss. et ed. 1 *numerantur*; sed propter difficultatem grammaticalem hanc lectionem non recepimus. [Trans. nota: mendum mss. videtur habere ortum ex ignoratia in legendo *numero* clausulae primae ad syntaxum poeticum, in quo nomen participet in utraque clausula.]

[8] In cod. Y additur *duo*.

[9] In aliquibus mss. et Vat. hic additur *nec modo*, sed minus ad rem et contradicente maiore parte mss. et ed. 1. In fine argumenti plures codd. cum ed. 1 *ergo non* loco *ergo nec*.

[10] Vat. cum uno alterove codice perperam omittit *numero*, quod tamen exhibetur in ceteris codd. et ed. 1.

[11] Communis definitio numeri, sumta ex Aristotele, IV. Phys. text. 133. (c. ult.); V. Metaph. text. 11. et 20, ac X. Metaph. text. 21 (IV. c. 6 et 15. ac IX. c. 6.), haec est: Numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum. Vel ex Boethio, I. de Arithmetica, c. 3: Numerus est unitatum collectio, vel quantitatis acervus ex unitatibus profusus (cfr. etiam de Trin. c. 3.). — Plures codd. ut A I P Q T V cc *singula* pro *singulis*. Paulo ante cod. I *ratio* loco *passio*. Mox codd. P Q *in his* pro *ex his*.

[12] Ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 loco *Sed* substituimus *Et*, quod aliquid codd. ut S Y omittunt.

[13] Vat. cum paucis codd. *est veniens*.

[14] In cod. T adiungitur *vel*. Mox aliqui codd. ut A T X Z cum ed. 1 *iuncta* pro *coniuncta*, quod aliqui ut S W omittunt.

[15] Vat. cum cod. cc, omissa particula *Et*, proxime sequentem propositionem cum praecedente coniungit novamque paulo / . . .

number [cum sit aliqua diversitas, scil. diversitas secundum numerum]. [Trans. note: The original reading of the critical text, *according to number* [secundum numerum] in place of *according to nature* [secundum naturam], seems to be erroneous, since the flow of the argument requires a contradistinction between the *according to nature* of the first clause, and the *according to number* of the second; and this change also corresponds more with that of the Quaracchi editors made in this very note; and to the logic of St. Ambrose’s saying.]

[5] Codex V reads *a diversity* [diversitas].

[6] Physics, Bk. I, text 66 (ch. 7).

[7] Very many manuscripts and edition 1 read *are numbered* [numerantur], but on account of the grammatical difficulty we have not received this reading. [Trans. note. this error of the manuscripts seems to have arisen by neglecting that the noun “*in number*” [numero] is used in a poetic construction, which requires it to be understood as part of each clause.]

[8] In codex Y there is added *Two* [duo].

[9] In some manuscripts, and in the Vatican edition, there is here added *nor in manner* [nec modo], but less to the point and with a greater part of the manuscripts and edition 1 contradicting this. At the end of the argument very many codices, together with edition 1, read *therefore They do not* [ergo non] for *therefore neither do They* [ergo nec].

[10] The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, faultily omits *in number* [numero], which, however, is exhibited in all the other codices and edition 1.

[11] The common definition of “number”, taken from Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text 133 (last chapter); Metaphysics, Bk V, texts 11 and 20 (Bk. IV, chs. 6 and 15), and Metaphysics, Bk. X, text 21 (Bk. IX, ch. 6), is this: A “number” is a multitude measured through “one”. And/or form (St. Severinus) Boethius, On Arithmetic, Bk. I, ch. 3: A “number” is a collection of unity, and/or a heap of quantity discharged out of unities [Numerus est unitatum collectio, vel quantitatis acervus ex unitatibus profusus] (cf. also his On the Trinity, ch. 3). [Trans. note: here the “number” defined is not the symbol or the ideal concept, but that which is signified by the former, according to the latter.] — Very many codices, such as A I P Q T V and cc, have *in each one* [in singula] for *in each* [in singulis]. A little before this codex I has *reckoning* [ratio] in place of *passion* [passio]. Next codices P and Q read *in those* [in his] for *out of those* [ex his].

[12] From very many, more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we haves substituted *And* [Et] in place of *But* [Sed], though some codices, such as S and Y omit the former.

[13] The Vatican edition, together with a few codices, have *is coming* [est veniens].

[14] In codex T there is added *and/or a* [vel]. Next some codices, such as A T X Z, together with edition 1, have *joined* [iuncta] for *conjoined* [coniuncta], which some codices, such as S and W, omit.

[15] The Vatican edition together with codex cc, having omitted the particle *And* [Et], conjoin the

following proposition with the preceding one, and begin / . . .

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p. 364

est, id est *naturae*, *rei naturae*, et *suppoositi* sive hypostasis, sed parincipaliter ipsius *quod est*; cum in divinis *quod est* sive essentia propter summam simplicitatem nullo modo sit multiplicabilis; ideo necesse est, quod ipsum *quod est* similiter remaneat indistinctum: et ideo impossibile est, quod cadat ibi diversitas secundum numerum. Nec tamen unum est numero;[1] quia ipsum *quod est* unum numero in creaturis non est dicibile de pluribus; sed in divinis ipsum *quod est*, quamvis sit unum, tamen de pluribus est dicibile. Et ratio huius est, quia idem est ibi *quod est* et *quod est*, quantum[2] ex parte rei. Et ideo, sicut *quo est* est communicabile pluribus, quamvis non multiplicabile, ita ipsum *quod est*. Unde possumus dicere, quod pluralitas personarum medium tenet inter *idem* numero et *diversum*. Quamvis enim ipsum *quod est* non numeretur, numeratur tamen ipse *qui est*; unde sunt ibi plures *qui*.

it is", that is of the *nature*, of the *thing of the nature*, and of the *supposit* or hypostasis, but principally of that "*which it is*": since among the divine that "*which it is*" or the Essence is in no manner multipliable on account of (Its) most high simplicity, for that reason, it is necessary, that that "*which it is*" similarly remain indistinct: and for that reason it is impossible, that there occur There a diversity according to number. However, neither is It one in number;[1] because in creatures that 'that "*which it is*" (is) one in number' is not sayable of a many; but among the divine that "*which it is*", though it is one, yet is sayable of Many. And the reason for this is, because There the "*whereby it is*" and the "*which it is*" is the Same, as much as (is)[2] on the part of the Thing. And for that reason, just as the "*by which it is*" is communicable to many, though not multipliable, thus (also) that "*which it is*". Wherefore we can say, that a plurality of persons holds a middle position [medium] between "*same* in number" and "*diverse* (in number)". For though that "*which it is*" is not numbered, yet that "*by which it is*" (is); whence there are many *Who's* There.

1. Et hoc vult dicere Damascenus, cum dicit: « Numero, non natura differunt hypostases ». Per hanc enim additionem: *non natura*, ipse contraxit differentiam secundum numerum sive distraxit a propria ratione.[3] Unde ipse dicit primo libro capitulo octavo: « Oportet scire, quod aliud est differre re, aliud ratione. In omnibus creaturis hypostasum *divsio re* consideratur, *communitas* vero *ratione*: in summa vero et supersubstantiali Trinitate est e converso ». Unde cum diversitas secundum numerum faciat sive notet diversitatem *in re* et natura, proprie loquendo, nisi nomen diversitatis secundum numerum distrahatur ad distinctionem suppositorum, non est concedendum, quod sit ibi diversitas secundum numerum, sed secundum numerum[4] *personarum* sive hypostasum. Et hoc vult dicere Damascenus, quando dicit,

1. And (St. John) Damascene was to say this, when he says: « In number, not in nature do the Hypostases differ ». For through this addition: "*not in nature*", he contracted the difference according to number or withdrew it [detraxit] from its proper reckoning.[3] Whence he says in the first book, chapter eight: « It is necessary to know [oportet scire], that it is one (thing) to differ in thing, another in reckoning. In all creatures the *division* of hypostases is considered *according to thing* [re], but (their) *community, according to a reckoning*: but in the most high and supersubstantial Trinity it is the other way around [est e converso] ». Whence since diversity according to number causes or notes a diversity *in the thing* and nature, properly speaking, unless the name of "diversity according to number" is

quod hypostases differunt numero, non, inquam, numero, qui dicat[5] diversitatem *in re* et natura, sed qui dicat differentiam in *proprietatibus* et *relationibus*, natura semper manente unica et indivisa. Ex hoc patet illud Damasenci.

withdrawn to the distinction of supposits, it must not be conceded, that there is a diversity There according to number, but (rather) according to the number[4] of *Persons* or Hypostases. And (St. John) Damascene wants to says this, when he says, that the Hypostases differ in number, not, I say, in the number, which means[5] a diversity *in thing* and nature, but the one which means a difference in *properties* and *relations*, with the Nature always remaining unique and undivided. And from this that (word of St. John) Damascene is clear.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod numero differunt ea quae numerantur; dicendum, quod verum est, quod[6] eo modo differunt, quo numerantur; sed non numerantur nisi quantum ad personas; et ita non differunt nisi numero hypostasum et proprietate.

2. To that which is objected second, that those which are numbered differ in number; it must be said, that it is true, that[6] they differ according to that standard of measure, whereby they are numbered; but They are not numbered except as much as regards Persons; and thus They do not differ except in the number of Hypostases and in property.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quae differunt re etc.; distinguendum est in hoc nomine *re*,[7] quia potest dicere *naturam* sive essentiam, et potest dicere *personam*. Si dicat *essentiam* et naturam, verum est; si *personam*, falsum est, et non habet locum illa divisio.

3. To that which is objected, that what differs in thing etc.; it must be distinguished in this noun "*thing*" [re],[7] because it can mean the "*nature*" or "essence", and it can mean a "*person*". If it means "*essence*" and "nature", it is true; if a "*person*", it is false, and that division does not have a place (among the divine).

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas numero respicit identitatem suppositi; dicendum, quod si suppositum dicatur ipsum *quod est*, tunc habet veritatem. Si autem dicatur ipse *qui est* sive persona, non habet veritatem nisi in his, in quibus differt *quo est* et *quod est*. Unde proprie loquendo, diversitas secundum numerum sequitur ipsum *quod est*; et ideo[8] in divinis non habet locum.

4. To that which is objected, that a unity in number looks back to the identity of the supposit; it must be said, that if a supposit be said (to be) that "*which it is*", then it has truth. But if it be said (to be) him "*who is*" or a person, it does not have truth, except in those, in which "*by which it is*" and "*which it is*" differ. Whence properly speaking, a diversity of number follows that "*which it is*"; and for that reason[8] (that argument) does not have a place among the divine.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur,[9] quod *idem* et *diversum* sufficienter dividunt ens, ergo idem numero, vel diversum; dicendum, quod illud verum est in ente, quod natum est numerari, sicut[10] ens creatum; sed in ente increato hoc deficit. Unde Hilarius de Trinitate:[11] « Deum ex Deo natum nec eundum nativitas nec aliud esse permittit »: et ita, sicut praedictum est, tenet medium inter idem numero et diversum.

5. To that which is objected,[9] that "*same*" and "*diverse*" sufficiently divide being [ens], therefore (They are) the same in number, and/or diverse: it must be said, that that is true in a being [in ente], which is bound to be numbered, such as[10] a created being [ens creatum]; but in an uncreated being this is lacking. Whence (St.) Hilary On the Trinity (says):[11] « The nativity permits that God born out of God is neither the same nor another »: and thus, as has been said before, ("person") holds a middle position

between "same" and "diverse".

SCHOLION.

I. Cum fides applicet numeros *unum* et *tres* ad divina, et numerus videatur non convenire cum aequalitate, S. Doctor apte agit hic de numero praecise sub hoc respectu, sive quomodo numerus admitti possit in divinis, quin derogetur summae divinae aequalitati. Plura de ratione numeri in divinis dicentur infra d. 24. a. 2. Cum Magister in hac re opinionem sustinuerit communiter reprobatam, multum illa aetate de ratione numeri in divinis est disputatum. Unde Alex. Hal. integram de hac materia scripsit quaestionem, septem membra complectentem, in qua diffuse exponit quae S. Bonav. hic brevi compendio exhibet.

II. Duplici conclusione quaestio resolvitur. Primo respondetur cum Magistro, quod in divinis non est differentia secundum numerum. Haec solutio intelligitur de numero proprie et . . .

SCHOLIUM

I. Since the Faith applies the numbers 1 and 3 to the divine, and "number" does not seem to agree with "equality", the Seraphic Doctor aptly deal here with number, precisely under this respect, or in the manner in which "number" can be admitted among the divine, without derogated from the most high, divine equality. More will be said on the reckoning of number among the divine, below in d. 24, a. 2. Since Master (Peter) upholds in this matter an opinion commonly reproved, much concerning the reckoning of "number" among the divine was in that age disputed. Whence Alexander of Hales wrote a whole question on this subject, comprising seven members, in which he expounded that which St. Bonaventure exhibits here in a brief compendium.

II. The question is resolved with a twofold conclusion. First it responds with Master (Peter), that among the divine there is no difference according to number. This solution is understood of "number" properly and . . .

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infra incipit, addito *ergo*, a verbis *Cum ergo in divinis*, quae lectio et in se incongrua est et contra antiquiores codd. nec non ed. 1.

[1] Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. adiecimus *unum numero*. Immediate post in pluribus codd. ut A D I L O R S T U etc. desideratur *in creaturis*.

[2] In paucis mss. ut Y Z additur *est*, et a cod. Z paulo infra post *ita* adiungitur *et*.

[3] Vat. quae ponit *ad differentiam* loco *a propria* castigatur ex mss. et sex primis edd. — Plurimi codd. cum primis edd. (excepta ed. 1). *distinxit* pro *distraxit*. Mox Vat., plurimus mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *ut* loco *Unde*.

[4] Lectio Vat. mutila, in qua male omittitur *sed secundum numerum*, resarcitur ope fere omnium mss. et ed. 1.

[5] Fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus hic et paulo infra *dicat* pro *dicit* et mox ope plurium mss. ut F H I T bb mutavimus *relatione* in *relationibus*. Dein pauci codd. ut R S U *unitate indivisa* loco *unica et indivisa*.

[6] Vat. cum cod. cc *quia*, sed contradicentibus aliis codd. et ed. 1. Paulo ante pro *differunt* aliqui codd. ut I K T V cc *differant*.

[7] Pauci codd. ut A D T *rei*, et paulo infra *dicit* loco *dicat*.

[8] Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 6 supplevimus *ideo*.

[9] In Vat. et cod. cc deest *quod obiicitur*.

[10] Ed. 1 addit *est*.

[11] Libr. I. n. 17: Quia Deo ex Deo nato neque eundem nativitas permittit esse, neque aliud. — In

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a new one a little below this, having added *therefore* [ergo], at the words *since among the divine* [cum in divinis], which reading is in itself incongruous and contrary to the more ancient codices and to edition 1.

[1] Trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions, we have inserted *one in number* [unum numero]. Immediately after this in very many codices, such as A D I L O R S T U etc., there is wanting *in creatures* [in creaturis].

[2] In a few manuscripts, such as Y and Z, there is added *is* [est].

[3] The Vatican edition, which puts *to a difference in* [ad differentiam] in place of *from a proper* [a propria], is corrected from the manuscripts and six first editions. — Very many codices, together with the first editions (except edition 1), read *distinguished* [distinxit] for *withdrew* [distraxit]. Next the Vatican edition, with very many manuscripts and edition 1 striving against this, has *as* [ut] in place of *Whence* [Unde].

[4] The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition, in which there is badly omitted *but (rather) according to number* [sed secundum numerum], is repaired with the help of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1.

[5] Trusting in very many codices and edition 1, we have substituted here and a little below this the subjunctive form of *means* [dicat] for the indicative, and next with the help of very many manuscripts, such as F H I T and bb, we have changed *relation*

quo textu, fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, Vat. *nec alium esse natura permittit*. Mox ex codd. cum ed. 1 *praedictum* loco *dictum* posuimus.

[relatione] to *relations* [relationibus]. Then a few codices, such as R S and U, have *undivided in unity* [unitate indivisa] for *unique and undivided* [unica et indivisa].

6 The Vatican edition together with codex cc reads *because* [quia], but with the other codices and edition 1 contradicting this. A little before this some codices, such as I K T V and cc, have the subjunctive *differ* [differant] rather than the indicative.

7 A few codices, such as A D and T, have *of a thing* [rei], and a little below this have the indicative form of *it means* [dicit] instead of the subjunctive.

8 From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 6, we have supplied *for that reason* [ideo].

9 In the Vatican edition and codex cc there is lacking *which is objected* [quod obiicitur].

10 Edition 1 adds *is* [est].

11 Book I, n. 17: Because to the God born out of God the nativity permits neither that He is the same, nor (that He is) another. — In which text, breaking with nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican edition reads *nor other in nature* [nec alium esse natura]. Next from the codices togther with edition 1, we have put *said before* [praedictum] in place of *said* [dictum].

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stricte sumto. Hanc assertionem omnibus doctoribus communem Seraphicus duplici ratione probat. *Prima* sumta est *a posteriori* i. e. ex consideratione earum rerum, quae proprie habent differentiam numeralem. Haec sic procedit: numerus supponit aggregationem multitudinis, haec vero unitatem limitatem, limitatio additionem, quia genus additione differentiae specificae, species additione principiorum individuantium, materia additione formae limitantur; additio autem implicat compositionem, quae minime est in Deo et consequenter nec differentia numeralis. *Secunda* ratio sumitur *a priori* sive ex intrinsecis conditionbis entium et praecipue entis infiniti. Haec procedit ex distinctione in omnibus entibus completis facienda inter *quo est* et *quod est*. *Quo est* significat naturam specificam vel genericam, *quod est* vero individuum seu suppositum: ex illo oritur unitas specifica vel generica, ex hoc vero indentitas vel diversitas secundum numerum. In Deo autem *quo est* et *quod est* minime multiplicantur et distinguuntur; tamen *qui est* (hypostasis) habet distinctionem et numerum personalem. — His suppositis facile intelligitur secunda conclusio, quae incipit a verbis: « Nec tamen est unum numero » etc. Licet enim

strictly taken. The Seraphic (Doctor) proves this assertion, common to all the doctors, with a twofold reckoning. The *first* is taken *a posteriori*, i. e. from a consideration of those things, which properly have a numeral difference. This proceeds in this manner: number supposes the aggregation of a multitude, but this a limited unity, limitation (supposes) addition, because a genus (is limited) by the addition of a specific difference, a species by the addition of individuating principles, (and) matter by the addition of forms; but addition implies composition, which is in God least of all and consequently neither (is) a numeral difference. The *second* reckoning is taken *a priori*, or out of the intrinsic conditions of beings and chiefly of an infinite being. This proceeds from the distinction, that must be made in all, completed beings, between "*whereby it is*" and "*which it is*". "*Whereby it is*" signifies the specific and/or generic nature, "*which it is*" however the individual or the supposit: from this there arises a specific and/or generic unity, however from this (in turn there arises) an identity (and/or) diversity according to number. But in God "*whereby it is*" and "*what it is*" are multiplied and distinguished lest of all, however "*who is*" (the Hypostasis) has a

in Deo *quo est* et *quod est* sint unum, tamen numeratur pluralitas pesonarum. Unde in divinis non est simpliciter numerus, sed cum additione determinante, nempe pluralitas « secundum numerum personarum » (hic ad 1. et dub. 2.). Ideo S. Doctor non consentit Magistro, qui numerum omnino removet a divinis, sed dicit infra (d. 24. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.): « Numerus importat distinctionem et super hoc compositionem aggregationis; et quamvis in divinis non sit aggregatio, nihilominus est distinctio, ideo numerus non simpliciter removendus est a divinis, sed numerus talis. Et Magister omnino removet, ideo in positione sua defecit. Et in illo articulo communiter non tenetur a magisteris Parisiensibus ».

distinction and personal number. — With these things supposed the second conclusion, which begins with these words, is easily understood: « However, neither is It one in number » etc.. For though in God "*whereby it is*" and *"what it is*" are one, yet the plurality of Persons is numbered. Whence among the divine there is not "number" simply, but (there is) with a determining addition, namely, plurality « according to the number of the Persons » (here in reply to n. 1, and dubium 2). For that reason the Seraphic Doctor does not consent with Master (Peter), who removed number entirely from the divine, but says below (d. 24, a. 2, q. 1, in the body of the question): « "Number" conveys distinction and above this the composition of aggregation; and though among the divine there is no aggregation, nevertheless there is distinction, for that reason "number" must not be simply removed from the divine, but (only) such a number. And Master (Peter) removes it entirely, for that reason he was lacking in his position. And in that article (his sentence) is not commonly held by the Masters of (the University of) Paris ».

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. a. 45. m. 1. 2. 3. 4. — Scot., in utroque scripto I. Sent. d. 24. a. unic. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 30. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 17; S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 42. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 24, prima princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 43. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 24. q. 2.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, a. 45, m. 1, 2, 3 and 4. . — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each edition, Sent., Bk. I, d. 24., a. sole. — St. Thomas, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 30, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Ma gnus), here in a. 17; Summa., p. I, tr. 9, q. 42, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 3. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, d. 24, 1st. princ., q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 43, q. 3. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, Sent., Bk. I, d. 24. q. 2.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

PARS II.

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 365-366.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX

PART II

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 365-366.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit: *Oret, ut quod credit intelligat*. Videtur enim improprie loqui, quia nullus orat quod non desiderat, nullus desiderat quod non considerat, nullus considerat quod non cognoscit vel intelligit: ergo a primo, si orat, ut intelligat, intelligit.[1] *Item*, nullus assentit rei, quam mente non intuetur sive concipit: ergo nullus assentit rei, quam non intelligit, quia intelligere est mente intueri.

Doubt I

In this part there are doubts about the text (of Master Peter) and first concerning this, which (St. Augustine) says: *Let him pray, to understand what he believes*. For it seems that he speaks improperly, because no one prays for what he does not desire, no one desires what he does not consider, no one considers what he does not cognize and/or understand: therefore from the first, if he prays, to understand, he (already) understands.[1] *Likewise*, no one assents to a thing, which he does not intuit or conceive in mind: therefore no one assents to a thing, which he does not understand, because "to understand" is "to intuit with the mind".

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod intelligere dupliciter dicitur: uno modo idem est quod cognoscere, quid est[2] quod per nomen dicitur; alio modo idem est quod ratione comprehendere. Primo modo antecedit fidem, quae *est ex auditu*;[3] secundo modo consequitur, quia nulla ratio humana sufficit ad manifestanda credibilia; nisi intellectus fide[4] illustretur et captivetur.

I respond: It must be said, that "to understand" is said in a twofold manner: in one manner it is the same as "to cognize, what it is[2] which is said through a name"; in another manner it is the same as "to comprehend by a reckoning". In the first manner it goes before the faith, which *is out of hearing*;[3] in the second manner it is consequent to it, because no human reckoning suffices to manifest the things which can be believed [credibilia]; unless the intellect be brightened and captivated by faith.[4]

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hac solutione Magistri, qua dicit: *Aliqua differre numero, quae sibi in computatione non adiunguntur*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia illi computationi aut respondet aliquid in *re*, aut *nihil*. Si *aliquid* respondet: ergo non differt a praecedenti differentia; si *nihil* respondet: ergo distinctio sive computatio nostra super[5] vanum fundata est.

Doubt II

Likewise is asked concerning this solution of Master (Peter), by which he says: *Some differ in number, which are not added to themselves in computation*. For he seems to speak badly, because to that computation either something in *the thing* corresponds [respondet], or *nothing* (does). If *something* corresponds: therefore it does not differ from the preceding difference; if *nothing* corresponds: therefore our distinction or computation has been founded upon[5] a void [vanum].

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod computationi nostrae, cum dicimus *unus, duo, tres*, aliquid respondet. Sed illud non est diversitas numeralis, sed distinctio personalis; unde in divinis non dicitur esse numerus nec differentia secundum numerum, nisi addatur secundum numerum personarum, qui dicit distinctionem in hypostasibus, non in natura; ideo quamvis dicantur tres personae, non tamen est ibi *tenarius*, sed *trinitas*.[6]

I respond: It must be said, that to our computation, when we say, "*one, two, three*", something does correspond. But it is not a numeral diversity, but a personal distinction; whence among the divine there is not said to be a "number" nor a "difference according to number", except one add "according to the number of the Persons", which means a distinction among the Hypostases, not (a distinction) in nature; for that reason, though "Three Persons" be said, yet there is not there a *group of three* [tenarius], but a *trinity*.[6]

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *cum Deus dicatur trinus, non debet dici triplex*. Videtur enim contra illud quod dicitur Sapientiae septimo,[7] quod *Spiritus sapientiae est multiplex*, ergo duplex vel quadruplex: ergo etc. *Item*, Isidorus[8] dicit, quod « Trinitas est multiplex et numerabilis ». *Item, ratione* videtur, quia pannus unus, in substantia duplicatus, dicitur duplex, triplicatus triplex; . . .

Doubt III

Likewise is asked of he says, that *though God is said (to be) Triune, He ought not be said (to be) threefold*. For it seems contrary to that which is said in the seventh (chapter) of Wisdom,[7] that *the Spirit of wisdom is manifold*, therefore twofold and/or fourfold: therefore etc. *Likewise*, (St.) Isidore[8] says, that « a "trinity" is (something) manifold and numerable ». *Likewise*, it seems *by reason*, that one cloth [pannus], doubled in substance, is said (to be) "twofold", tripled "threefold", . . .

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[1] Ultimam partem huius argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, sic mutilam exhibet: *nullus desiderat quod non cognoscit vel intelligit. Item*.

[2] Vat. et cod. cc *aliquid* loco *quid est*, sed contra communem Scholasticorum modum loquendi et contra mss. (quorum tamen aliqui ut K W ee minus apte *aliquid est*) et ed. 1. Mox auctoritate plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *comprehendere* pro *apprehendere*. — Explicationem huius distinctionis accipe a S. Doctore, qui III. Sent. d. 24. dub. 3. eandem obiectionem resolvendo ait: Uno modo intelligere dicitur large nosse, quid est quod dicitur per nomen; et illud intelligere semper praecedit assensum fidei, nec aliquid creditur, quin isto modo prius intelligatur.

[1] The last part of this argument, the Vatican edition together with codex cc, yet with the other codices and edition 1 striving against this, exhibit in a mutilated form: *no one desires what he does not cognize and/or understand. Likewise.* [nullus desiderat quod non cognoscit vel intelligit. Item.].

[2] The Vatican edition and codex cc read *anything* [aliquid] in place of *what it is* [quid est], but contrary to the common manner of speaking of the Scholastics, and contrary to the manuscripts (some of which, however, such as K W and ee, read less aptly *the something it is* [aliquid est]) and edition 1. Next on the authority of very many codices and edition 1, we have substituted *comprehend* [comprehendere] for *apprehend* [apprehendere]. — Accept the explanation for this distinction from the

Alio modo intelligere hoc est ratione praevia cogitare, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus: Quod intelligimus, debemus rationi, quod credimus, auctoritati. Et de isto intelligit Augustinus, quod quaedam sunt quae prius creduntur, et postea intelliguntur, sicut sunt articuli fidei, qui sunt supra rationem etc. — Paulo ante pauci codd. ut P Q *est dupliciter* pro *dupliciter dicitur*.

[3] Rom. 10, 17.

[4] Plures codd. ut G H P Q ff cum ed. 1 *luce fidei* pro *fide*. — Plura de hoc dubio vide apud Alex. Hal. S. p. III. q. 68. m. 6. a. 6.

[5] Vat. addit *nihil et*, quod deest in fere omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.

[6] Cfr. hic q. 1.

[7] Vers. 22, ubi Vulgata loco *sapientiae* legit *intelligentiae*.

[8] Cfr. infra d. XXIV lit. Magistri in fine, ubi tota Isidori propositio habetur.

Seraphic Doctor, who in Sent., Bk III, d. 24, dubium 3, resolving the same objection, says: In one manner "to understand" is meant in a broad sense as "to know, what it is which is said through a name"; and that "to understand" always precedes the assent of faith, nor is anything believed, which is not first understood in that manner. In the other manner "to understand" is this, "to think according to a previous reckoning", according to which (St.) Augustine says: What we understand, we ought by a reckoning; what we believe, by an authority. And of this (St.) Augustine understands, that there are certain (things) which are first believed, and afterwards understood, such as are the articles of the Faith, which are above reason etc.. — A little before this a few codices, such as P and Q, have *is in a twofold manner* [est dupliciter] for *is said in a twofold manner* [dupliciter dicitur].

[3] Rm. 10:17.

[4] Very many codices, such as G H P Q and ff, together with edition 1, have *by the light of faith* [luce fide] for *by faith* [fide]. — See more on this doubt in Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. III, q. 68, m. 6, a. 6.

[5] The Vatican edition adds *nothing and* [nihil et], which is lacking in nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3.

[6] Cf. here q. 1.

[7] Verse 22, where the Vulgate in place of *wisdom* [sapientiae] has *understanding* [intelligentiae].

[8] Cf. below the text of Master (Peter), Distinction XXIV, at the end, where the entire proposition of (St.) Isidore is had.

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p. 366

ergo si una est substantia in tribus hypostasibus, videtur triplicari in eis et ita[1] triplex dici.

therefore, if there is one Substance in Three Hypostases, it seems that It is tripled in Them and thus[1] is said (to be) "threefold".

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod distinctio personarum non potest significari per additionem termini numeralis[2] ad hoc nomen *Deus* nisi huius nominis *trinus*, quod specialiter ad hoc inventum est, ut significet pluralitatem in suppositis cum unitate formae. Quia ergo hoc nomen *triplex* dicit distinctionem simpliciter in termino cui additur, vel quantum ad formam, vel quantum ad partium multiplicationem, et quia[3] in Deo non cadit multiplicatio nec quantum ad formam, nec quantum ad partes: ideo nullo modo potest dici *triplex*.

I respond: It must be said, that the distinction of the Persons cannot be signified through the addition of a numeral[2] term to this name "*God*", except (through the addition) of this name "*triune*", which has been invented [inventum est] specially for this, to signify the plurality among the Supposits with a unity of form. Therefore, because this name "*threefold*" means a distinction simply in the term to which it is added, either as much as regards form, and/or as much as regards the multiplication of parts, and because[3] in God there occurs no multiplication, neither as much as regards form, nor as much as regards parts: for that reason in no manner can (God) be said (to be) "*threefold*".

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod[4] dicitur *multiplex*; dicendum, quod istud est dictum causaliter, quia multorum et variorum donorum

Therefore, because is objected, that[4] (the Spirit of wisdom) is said (to be) *manifold*; it must be said, that that is said in the manner

effectivum est principium,[5] in quibus est vera diversitas; non sic in personis. — Quod dicit Isidorus, improprie dictum est et expondendum est. — Ad illud, quod idem pannus dicitur triplex;[6] dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen secundum alias e alias partes; et quia in Deo non est alietas partium nec formae, ideo non potest dicit *triplex*.[7]

of a cause, because He is the effective principle[5] of many and various gifts, among which there is a true diversity; not so (is it) among the Persons. — What (St.) Isidore says, has been said in an improper manner and is to be expounded (as such). — To that, that the same cloth is said (to be) "threefold";[6] it must be said, that it is true, but yet according to now some parts now others [secundum alias et alias partes]; and because in God there is not an anotherness of parts nor of forms, for that reason He cannot be said (to be) "*threefold*".[7]

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *in rebus corporeis plus sunt duae quam una*. Videtur enim instantia esse, quia ignis cum ferro non est[8] maius quam ferrum per se, sive lux cum aëre. *Si tu dicas*, quod non sunt corpora; obiicitur, quod corpus glorificatum simul est cum non glorificatum, et tantum locum occupat non glorificatum per se, quantum cum glorioso: ergo non sunt maius, quia corpus maius maiorem occupat locum.

Doubt IV

Likewise is asked of this which (St. Augustine) says, that *in corporeal things two are more than one*. For there seems to be contrary evidence [instantia], because fire together with iron is not[8] greater than fire by itself, or (similarly) light with air. *If you say*, that they are not bodies; it is objected, that the glorified body is simultaneous with the non-glorified one, and the non-glorified one occupies as much space [locum] by itself, as with the glorious one: therefore, they are not greater, because a greater body occupies more space.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus[9] loquitur de rebus corporeis, quarum quaelibet est corpus; sed ignis in ferro et lux in aëre non est corpus, sed proprietas corporis. *Praeterea* notandum, quod Augustinus non accipit hic[10] *maius* extensive, sed accipit *plus* quantum ad veritatem existentiae vel essentiae. Cum enim non sit summa veritas in qualibet re, plus est de veritate existentiae in duabus rebus quam in una, quamvis non sit ibi plus de latitudine distantiae sive de extensione[11] magnitudinis vel capacitatis contentivae.

I respond: It must be said, that (St.) Augustine[9] speaks of corporeal things, any of which is a body; but fire in iron and light in air is not a body, but a property of a body. *Moreover*, it must be noted, that (St.) Augustine does not here[10] accept "*greater*" extensively, but accepts "*more*" as much as regards the truth of existence and/or of essence. For since most high Truth is not in any thing, there is more of the truth of existence in two things, than in one, even though there is not more of the breadth of distance or of the extension[11] of magnitude and/or contentive capacity.

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[1] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ita*. Mox plures codd. cum ed. 1 *tripliciter* loco *triplex*. Paulo supra cod. Z *est duplex* pro *dicitur duplex*.
[2] Vat., quae habet *numerabilis* pro *numeralis*, emendatur ex mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra cod. T cum ed. 1 *significaret* loco *significet*.
[3] In pluribus mss. ut A S T W Y etc. et ed. 1 omittitur *quia*, ac dein ponitur *nec* loco *non*.
[4] Hic et paulo infra post *quia* supple: Spiritus sapientiae.
[5] Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, in hac propositione post *quia* addit *est causa*, ac mox post

[1] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *thus*. Next very many codices together with edition 1 have *in a threefold manner* [tripliciter] in place of *"threefold"* [triplex]. A little above this (on the preceding page) codex Z reads *is twofold* [est duplex] for *is said (to be) "twofold"* [dicitur duplex].
[2] The Vatican edition, which has *numerable* [numerabilis] for *numeral* [numeralis], is emended from the manuscripts and edition 1. A little below this codex T, together with edition 1, has the imperfect tense for *signify* [significaret] instead of

et contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 repetit *quia*. Dein aliqui codd. ut A L S Z *divinorum effectuum* loco *donorum effectivum*, alqui autem ut G H K O ee ff omisso *donorum* legunt *variorum effectuum est* etc. Mox post *non sic* cod. V adiungit *est*.

[6] Vat. et cod. cc *multiplex*, sed contra alios codd. et ed. 1.

[7] Plura de hoc videsis infra d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 1. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 18.

[8] Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. expunximus additum *quid*, et mox ex plurimus mss. et ed. 1 post *Si* supplevimus *tu*.

[9] Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 12, ex quo sumtus est textus huius dubii. — Paulo infra auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 post *ferro* adiecimus *et*.

[10] Vat. *ibi*, obnitentibus plurimus mss. et ed. 1.

[11] Ita fere omnes codd. dum Vat. loco *de extensione* ponit *extensivae*, cum qua convenit ed. 1, quae post *magnitudinis* cum cod. M addit *dimensivae*.

the present tense.

[3] In very many manuscripts, such as A S T W Y etc., and edition 1, there is omitted *because* [quia], and then there is put *neither a* [nec] for *no* [non].

[4] Here and a little below this after *because* [quia] supply: the Spirit of wisdom.

[5] The Vatican edition, breaking with the manuscripts and edition 1, in this proposition reads *He is the cause of many and because He is the effective principle of various gifts* by adding *He is the cause* [causa est] after the word *because* [quia], and then *because* [quia] after the *and* [et], contrary to very many codices and edition 1. Then some codices, such as A L S Z have *the principle of . . . divine effects* [divinorum effectuum etc.] for *the effective principle of . . . gifts* [donorum effectivum], yet some, such as G H K O ee and ff, read like the first group, but omit *divine* [divinorum]. Next after *not so* [non sic] codex V adds *is it* [est].

[6] The Vatican edition and code cc read *"manifold"* [multiplex], but contrary to the other codices and edition 1.

[7] See more on this below in d. 24, a. 3, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 66, m. 1, a. 4. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 18.

[8] Trusting in the manuscripts and six first editions, we have expunged the added *something* [quid], and then from very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *you* [tu] after *If* [Si].

[9] On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 10. n. 12, from which the text of this doubt has been taken. — A little below this, on the authority of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have inserted after *iron* [ferro] *and* [et].

[10] The Vatican edition reads *there* [ibi], with very many manuscripts and edition 1 striving against this.

[11] Thus nearly all the codices, while the Vatican edition in place of *the extension of* [de extensione] reads *extensive* [extensivae], with which edition 1 agrees, which after *magnitude* [magnitudinis] adds together with codex M *dimensional* [dimensivae].

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.